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Electoral Campaigns as Dynamic Contests

Author

Listed:
  • Avidit Acharya

    (Stanford University, and the Hoover Institution Author-Name: Edoardo Grillo
    University of Padova)

  • Takuo Sugaya

    (Stanford University)

  • Eray Turkel

    (Stanford University)

Abstract

We develop a model of electoral campaigns as dynamic contests in which two office-motivated candidates allocate their budgets over time to affect their odds of winning. We measure the candidates’ evolving odds of winning using a state variable that tends to decay over time, and we refer to it as the can- didates’ “relative popularity.” In our baseline model, the equilibrium ratio of spending by each candidate equals the ratio of their initial budgets; spending is independent of past realizations of relative popularity; and there is a positive relationship between the strength of decay in the popularity process and the rate at which candidates increase their spending over time as election day ap- proaches. We use this relationship to recover estimates of the perceived decay rate in popularity leads in actual U.S. subnational elections.

Suggested Citation

  • Avidit Acharya & Takuo Sugaya & Eray Turkel, 2022. "Electoral Campaigns as Dynamic Contests," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0293, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
    • Handle: RePEc:pad:wpaper:0293
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

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