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Dynamic team contests with complementary efforts

Author

Listed:
  • Maria Arbatskaya

    (Emory University)

  • Hideo Konishi

    (Boston College)

Abstract

In this paper, we study dynamic team contests. In the framework of a Tullock contest between two teams that are generating impacts according to the Cobb–Douglas effort aggregation function, we examine how equilibrium efforts and winning probabilities depend on the timing of the actions. We show that in contrast to synchronous contests, asynchronous contests with publicly observable actions do not result in the same equilibrium outcome as the one-stage contest; they are strategically unbalancing, leading to more lopsided contests. The results have implications about the design of team contests in which efforts are complementary.

Suggested Citation

  • Maria Arbatskaya & Hideo Konishi, 2025. "Dynamic team contests with complementary efforts," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 29(3), pages 611-633, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:29:y:2025:i:3:d:10.1007_s10058-023-00332-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00332-y
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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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