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Contests – A comparison of timing and information structures

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  • Ludwig, Sandra

Abstract

We study a model of imperfectly discriminating contests with two ex ante symmetric agents. We consider four institutional settings: Contestants move either sequentially or simultaneously and in addition their types are either public or private information. We find that an effort-maximizing designer of the contest prefers the sequential to the simultaneous setting from an ex ante perspective. Moreover, the sequential contest Pareto dominates the simultaneous one when the contestants’ types are sufficiently negatively correlated. Regarding the information structure, the designer ex ante prefers private information while the contestants prefer public information.

Suggested Citation

  • Ludwig, Sandra, 2011. "Contests – A comparison of timing and information structures," Discussion Papers in Economics 12209, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:lmu:muenec:12209
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Grossmann, Martin, 2014. "Uncertain contest success function," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 134-148.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    sequential contests; asymmetric information; rent-seeking;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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