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Sequential Rent Seeking

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  • Glazer, Amihai
  • Hassin, Refael

Abstract

We consider n firms which choose rent-seeking expenditures sequentially, each player anticipating the rent-seeking expenditures that will be made by later movers. We find that the earlier movers need not make larger profits than later movers, and that aggregate profits are lower than in a game in which firms make simultaneous moves. Copyright 2000 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Glazer, Amihai & Hassin, Refael, 2000. "Sequential Rent Seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 102(3-4), pages 219-228, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:102:y:2000:i:3-4:p:219-28
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    Cited by:

    1. Hinnosaar, Toomas, 2024. "Optimal sequential contests," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(1), January.
    2. Toomas Hinnosaar, 2021. "Stackelberg Independence," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(1), pages 214-238, March.
    3. Nava Kahana & Doron Klunover, 2017. "Sequential Lottery Contests with Multiple Participants," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2017-02, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    4. Klunover, Doron, 2018. "A note on rent dissipation in lottery contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 90-93.
    5. Barbieri, Stefano & Serena, Marco, 2021. "Winner’s effort maximization in large contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).
    6. Kahana, Nava & Klunover, Doron, 2018. "Sequential lottery contests with multiple participants," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 126-129.
    7. Konstantinos Protopappas, 2023. "Manipulation of moves in sequential contests," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 61(3), pages 511-535, October.
    8. de Roos, Nicolas & Matros, Alexander & Smirnov, Vladimir & Wait, Andrew, 2018. "Shipwrecks and treasure hunters," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 259-283.
    9. Damianov, Damian S. & Peeters, Ronald, 2017. "On the disclosure of ticket sales in charitable lotteries," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 73-76.
    10. Kwiatkowski, Andrzej, 2010. "Affirmative Action Policy and Effort Levels. Sequential-Move Contest Game Argument," SIRE Discussion Papers 2010-83, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
    11. Sandra Ludwig, 2012. "Contests—a comparison of timing and information structures," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 153(3), pages 341-355, December.
    12. Avidit Acharya & Edoardo Grillo & Takuo Sugaya & Eray Turkel, 2019. "Dynamic Campaign Spending," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 601, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    13. Deng, Shanglyu & Fu, Qiang & Wu, Zenan & Zhu, Yuxuan, 0. "Contests with sequential entry and incomplete information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    14. Konrad, Kai A., 2007. "Strategy in contests: an introduction [Strategie in Turnieren – eine Einführung]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2007-01, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    15. Richard Cothren & Ravi Radhakrishnan, 2018. "Productivity growth and welfare in a model of allocative inefficiency," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 123(3), pages 277-298, April.
    16. Avidit Acharya & Takuo Sugaya & Eray Turkel, 2022. "Electoral Campaigns as Dynamic Contests," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0293, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
    17. M. Christian Lehmann, 2020. "Aiding refugees, aiding peace?," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(5), pages 1687-1704, September.

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