IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ecolet/v150y2017icp73-76.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

On the disclosure of ticket sales in charitable lotteries

Author

Listed:
  • Damianov, Damian S.
  • Peeters, Ronald

Abstract

We show that a policy of disclosing the ticket sales during a fundraising lottery raises total revenue when there are more than two bettors. The optimal timing of the disclosure is when about half of the players have purchased lottery tickets.

Suggested Citation

  • Damianov, Damian S. & Peeters, Ronald, 2017. "On the disclosure of ticket sales in charitable lotteries," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 73-76.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:150:y:2017:i:c:p:73-76
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.012
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176516304645
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.012?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Varian, H.R., 1989. "Sequential Provision Of Public Goods," Papers 89-17, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
    2. Damianov, Damian S., 2015. "Should lotteries offer discounts on multiple tickets?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 84-86.
    3. Linster, Bruce G, 1993. "Stackelberg Rent-Seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(2), pages 307-321, October.
    4. Glazer, Amihai & Hassin, Refael, 2000. "Sequential Rent Seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 102(3-4), pages 219-228, March.
    5. John Morgan, 2000. "Financing Public Goods by Means of Lotteries," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 67(4), pages 761-784.
    6. Franke, Jörg & Leininger, Wolfgang, 2014. "On the efficient provision of public goods by means of biased lotteries: The two player case," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(3), pages 436-439.
    7. Vesterlund, Lise, 2003. "The informational value of sequential fundraising," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(3-4), pages 627-657, March.
    8. Dixit, Avinash K, 1987. "Strategic Behavior in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 891-898, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Konrad, Kai A., 2007. "Strategy in contests: an introduction [Strategie in Turnieren – eine Einführung]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2007-01, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    2. Sandra Ludwig, 2012. "Contests—a comparison of timing and information structures," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 153(3), pages 341-355, December.
    3. de Roos, Nicolas & Matros, Alexander & Smirnov, Vladimir & Wait, Andrew, 2018. "Shipwrecks and treasure hunters," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 259-283.
    4. Klunover, Doron, 2018. "A note on rent dissipation in lottery contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 90-93.
    5. Konstantinos Protopappas, 2023. "Manipulation of moves in sequential contests," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 61(3), pages 511-535, October.
    6. Damian S. Damianov & Ronald Peeters, 2018. "Prize‐Based Mechanisms For Fund‐Raising: Theory And Experiments," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(3), pages 1562-1584, July.
    7. Nava Kahana & Doron Klunover, 2017. "Sequential Lottery Contests with Multiple Participants," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2017-02, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    8. Toomas Hinnosaar, 2021. "Stackelberg Independence," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(1), pages 214-238, March.
    9. Hinnosaar, Toomas, 2024. "Optimal sequential contests," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(1), January.
    10. Paskalev, Zdravko & Yildirim, Huseyin, 2017. "A theory of outsourced fundraising: Why dollars turn into “Pennies for Charity”," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 1-18.
    11. Lange, Andreas, 2006. "Providing public goods in two steps," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 173-178, May.
    12. Craig E. Landry & Andreas Lange & John A. List & Michael K. Price & Nicholas G. Rupp, 2010. "Is a Donor in Hand Better Than Two in the Bush? Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(3), pages 958-983, June.
    13. Ella Segev & Aner Sela, 2011. "Sequential All-Pay Auctions with Head Starts and Noisy Outputs," Working Papers 1106, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    14. Emrah Arbak & Marie Claire Villeval, 2006. "Endogenous Leadership Selection and Influence," Post-Print halshs-00175479, HAL.
    15. Warneryd, Karl, 2003. "Information in conflicts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 121-136, May.
    16. Emrah Arbak & Marie Claire Villeval, 2013. "Voluntary Leadership: Selection and Influence," Post-Print halshs-00664830, HAL.
    17. Deng, Shanglyu & Fu, Qiang & Wu, Zenan & Zhu, Yuxuan, 0. "Contests with sequential entry and incomplete information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    18. M. Christian Lehmann, 2020. "Aiding refugees, aiding peace?," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(5), pages 1687-1704, September.
    19. Philipp Denter & Dana Sisak, 2010. ""Who's the thief?": Asymmetric Information and the Creation of Property Rights," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2010 2010-27, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen.
    20. Wang, Zhewei & Zhou, Lixue, 2022. "Information disclosure in sequential (and simultaneous) contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Charity lotteries; Ticket sales; Disclosure policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:150:y:2017:i:c:p:73-76. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.