Should lotteries offer discounts on multiple tickets?
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References listed on IDEAS
- Bos, Olivier, 2011. "How lotteries outperform auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 110(3), pages 262-264, March.
- John Morgan, 2000. "Financing Public Goods by Means of Lotteries," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(4), pages 761-784.
- Fang, Hanming, 2002. "Lottery versus All-Pay Auction Models of Lobbying," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 112(3-4), pages 351-371, September.
- Maxim Engers & Brian McManus, 2007. "Charity Auctions," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 48(3), pages 953-994, August.
- Nti, Kofi O, 1999. "Rent-Seeking with Asymmetric Valuations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 98(3-4), pages 415-430, March.
- Perez-Castrillo, J David & Verdier, Thierry, 1992. "A General Analysis of Rent-Seeking Games," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 73(3), pages 335-350, April.
- Damianov Damian S. & Peeters Ronald, 2012. "The lowest-bid all-pay-auction as a fund-raising mechanism: Theoretically optimal but behaviorally fragile," Research Memorandum 051, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Jacob K. Goeree & Emiel Maasland & Sander Onderstal & John L. Turner, 2005. "How (Not) to Raise Money," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(4), pages 897-926, August.
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- Damianov, Damian S. & Peeters, Ronald, 2017.
"On the disclosure of ticket sales in charitable lotteries,"
Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 73-76.
- Damianov, Damian S. & Peeters, Ronald, 2016. "On the disclosure of ticket sales in charitable lotteries," Research Memorandum 030, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
- repec:bla:ecinqu:v:56:y:2018:i:3:p:1562-1584 is not listed on IDEAS
More about this item
KeywordsFundraising mechanisms; Complete information; Asymmetries; Lottery ticket discounts;
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
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