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Stackelberg Rent-Seeking

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  • Linster, Bruce G

Abstract

In this paper, the author presents a formal analysis of rent-seeking games in which the players do not move simultaneously. He considers rent-seeking situations where the players are risk neutral and may value the prize differently. The subgame perfect equilibrium outcome in this Stackelberg game provides several surprising and interesting results. The author extends the problem to deal with cases of incomplete information concerning the value a player has for the politically contestable rent. Copyright 1993 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Linster, Bruce G, 1993. "Stackelberg Rent-Seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(2), pages 307-321, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:77:y:1993:i:2:p:307-21
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