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Bruce Linster

Personal Details

First Name:Bruce
Middle Name:
Last Name:Linster
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pli398

Affiliation

Department of Economics and Geosciences
United States Air Force Academy

Colorado Springs, Colorado (United States)
http://www.usafa.edu/df/dfeg/?catname=dfeg

: (719) 333- 2381


RePEc:edi:deafaus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

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Jump to: Articles

Articles

  1. Richard L. Fullerton & Bruce G. Linster & Michael McKee & Stephen Slate, 2002. "Using Auctions To Reward Tournament Winners: Theory and Experimental Investigations," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(1), pages 62-84, Spring.
  2. Linster, Bruce G, 1998. "An Evolutionary Explanation for Rotten Kids," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 36(1), pages 98-107, January.
  3. Linster, Bruce G, 1994. "Cooperative Rent-Seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 81(1-2), pages 23-34, October.
  4. Linster, Bruce G, 1994. "Stochastic Evolutionary Dynamics in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 32(2), pages 342-357, April.
  5. Linster, Bruce G, 1993. "A Generalized Model of Rent-Seeking Behavior," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(2), pages 421-435, October.
  6. Linster, Bruce G, 1993. "Stackelberg Rent-Seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(2), pages 307-321, October.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Articles

  1. Richard L. Fullerton & Bruce G. Linster & Michael McKee & Stephen Slate, 2002. "Using Auctions To Reward Tournament Winners: Theory and Experimental Investigations," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(1), pages 62-84, Spring.

    Cited by:

    1. Jean-Michel Benkert & Igor Letina, 2016. "Designing dynamic research contests," ECON - Working Papers 235, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    2. Amihai Glazer, 2008. "Bargaining with Rent Seekers," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(5), pages 859-871, October.
    3. Letina, Igor & Benkert, Jean-Michel, 2016. "Designing Dynamic Research Tournaments," Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145738, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    4. Prüfer, J., 2009. "Semi-Public Contests," Discussion Paper 2009-33, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    5. Jason Shachat & J. Todd Swarthout, 2003. "Procurement Auctions for Differentiated Goods," Experimental 0310004, EconWPA.
    6. Koh, Youngwoo, 2017. "Incentive and sampling effects in procurement auctions with endogenous number of bidders," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 393-426.
    7. Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," Discussion Paper Series dp662, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    8. David Hendry, 2010. "Climate Change: Lessons for our Future from the Distant Past," Economics Series Working Papers 485, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    9. Letina, Igor & Schmutzler, Armin, 2015. "Designing Innovation Contests for Diversity," CEPR Discussion Papers 10736, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Donja Darai & Jens Grosser & Nadja Trhal, 2009. "Patents versus Subsidies � A Laboratory Experiment," SOI - Working Papers 0905, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich.
    11. Nicola Dimitri, 2012. "Some Law & Economics Considerations on the EU Pre-Commercial Procurement of Innovation," Working Papers 2012/10, Maastricht School of Management.
    12. Giebe, Thomas, 2014. "Innovation contests with entry auction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 165-176.
    13. J. Todd Swarthout & Jason Shachat, 2004. "The performance of reverse auctions versus request for quotes when procuring goods with quality differences," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 255, Econometric Society.
    14. Anja Schöttner, 2008. "Fixed-prize tournaments versus first-price auctions in innovation contests," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 35(1), pages 57-71, April.
    15. Igor Letina & Armin Schmutzler, 2015. "Inducing variety: a theory of innovation contests," ECON - Working Papers 200, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Jun 2017.
    16. Kaplan, Todd R. & Zamir, Shmuel, 2015. "Advances in Auctions," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier.

  2. Linster, Bruce G, 1998. "An Evolutionary Explanation for Rotten Kids," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 36(1), pages 98-107, January.

    Cited by:

    1. D.J. Butler, 2000. "Accounting for Heterogeneous Choices in One-shot Prisoner's Dilemma and Chicken Games," Economics Discussion / Working Papers 00-22, The University of Western Australia, Department of Economics.

  3. Linster, Bruce G, 1994. "Cooperative Rent-Seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 81(1-2), pages 23-34, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Erik O. Kimbrough & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2012. "Side-Payments and the Costs of Conflict," Working Papers 12-01, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    2. Boudreau, James W. & Shunda, Nicholas, 2015. "Tacit Collusion in Repeated Contests with Noise," MPRA Paper 65671, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Liston-Heyes, Catherine, 2001. "Setting the Stakes in Environmental Contests," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 1-12, January.
    4. Dijkstra, Bouwe R., 1998. "A two-stage rent-seeking contest for instrument choice and revenue division, applied to environmental policy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 281-301, May.
    5. Skaperdas, S. & Syropoulos, C., 1998. "Complementarity in Contests," Papers 97-98-21, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
    6. Raouf Boucekkine & Fabien Prieur & Klarizze Puzon, 2014. "The Dynamics of Lobbying under Uncertainty: On Political Liberalization in Arab Countries," Post-Print hal-01474428, HAL.
    7. Boudreau, James W. & Sanders, Shane & Shunda, Nicholas, 2017. "The Role of Noise in Alliance Formation and Collusion in Conflicts," MPRA Paper 81533, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Erik O. Kimbrough & Roman Sheremeta, 2010. "Make Him an Offer He Can’t Refuse: Avoiding Conflicts through Side Payments," Working Papers 10-23, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    9. Sebagh Thierry, 1995. "Recherche De Rente : Jeu de Guerre et Guerre D'enjeux - II," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 6(2-3), pages 1-20, June.
    10. Janmaat, Johannus A., 2007. "Stakeholder Engagement in Land Development Decisions: A Waste of Effort?," MPRA Paper 6147, University Library of Munich, Germany.

  4. Linster, Bruce G, 1994. "Stochastic Evolutionary Dynamics in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 32(2), pages 342-357, April.

    Cited by:

    1. Samuelson, Larry, 1996. "Bounded rationality and game theory," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(Supplemen), pages 17-35.
    2. Matthijs van Veelen & Julian Garcia, 2012. "In and out of Equilibrium II: Evolution in Repeated Games with Discounting and Complexity Costs," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-089/I, Tinbergen Institute.
    3. García, Julián & van Veelen, Matthijs, 2016. "In and out of equilibrium I: Evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 161-189.

  5. Linster, Bruce G, 1993. "A Generalized Model of Rent-Seeking Behavior," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(2), pages 421-435, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Bettina Klose & Dan Kovenock, 2013. "The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information and Identity-Dependent Externalities," Working Papers 13-10, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    2. Bettina Klose & Dan Kovenock, 2015. "Extremism drives out moderation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(4), pages 861-887, April.
    3. Ian A. MacKenzie, 2009. "Controlling externalities in the presence of rent seeking," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 09/111, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
    4. Federico Quaresima & Fabio Fiorillo, 2017. "The patronage effect: a theoretical perspective of patronage and political selection," Working papers 63, Società Italiana di Economia Pubblica.
    5. Fu, Qiang & Lu, Jingfeng, 2013. "Competitive effect of cross-shareholdings in all-pay auctions with complete information," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 267-277.
    6. Esteban, Joan & Ray, Debraj, 1999. "Conflict and Distribution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 379-415, August.
    7. Konrad, Kai A., 2007. "Strategy in contests: an introduction
      [Strategie in Turnieren – eine Einführung]      ," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2007-01, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).

  6. Linster, Bruce G, 1993. "Stackelberg Rent-Seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(2), pages 307-321, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Philipp Denter & Dana Sisak, 2010. ""Who's the thief?": Asymmetric Information and the Creation of Property Rights," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2010 2010-27, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen.
    2. Nava Kahana & Doron Klunover, 2017. "Sequential Lottery Contests with Multiple Participants," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2017-02, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    3. Anthony Heyes & Catherine Liston-Heyes, 2005. "Economies of scope and scale in green advocacy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 423-436, September.
    4. Romano, Richard & Yildirim, Huseyin, 2005. "On the endogeneity of Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria: games of accumulation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 120(1), pages 73-107, January.
    5. D. Fiaschi & R. Orsini, 1998. "Long Run Growth and Income Distribution in an Olg Model With Strategic Job-Seeking and Credit Rationing," Working Papers 331, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    6. Ella Segev & Aner Sela, 2011. "Sequential All-Pay Auctions with Head Starts and Noisy Outputs," Working Papers 1106, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    7. Damianov, Damian S. & Peeters, Ronald, 2017. "On the disclosure of ticket sales in charitable lotteries," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 73-76.
    8. Wärneryd, Karl, 2000. "Information in Conflicts," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 388, Stockholm School of Economics.
    9. Christian Ewerhart & Julia Grünseis, 2018. "Voluntary disclosure in unfair contests," ECON - Working Papers 279, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    10. Dijkstra, Bouwe R., 1998. "Cooperation by way of support in a rent seeking contest for a public good," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 703-725, November.
    11. Ludwig, Sandra, 2011. "Contests – A comparison of timing and information structures," Discussion Papers in Economics 12209, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    12. Dijkstra, Bouwe R., 1998. "A two-stage rent-seeking contest for instrument choice and revenue division, applied to environmental policy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 281-301, May.
    13. Hurley, Terrance M. & Shogren, Jason F., 1998. "Effort levels in a Cournot Nash contest with asymmetric information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 195-210, June.
    14. ISKAKOV, Mikhail & ISKAKOV, Alexey & ZAKHAROV, Alexey, 2014. "Equilibria in secure strategies in the Tullock contest," CORE Discussion Papers 2014010, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    15. Juan D. Montoro-Pons, 2013. "Regulator preferences and lobbying efforts in rent-seeking contests," Chapters,in: Constitutional Economics and Public Institutions, chapter 14, pages 257-278 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    16. Richard Cothren & Ravi Radhakrishnan, 2018. "Productivity growth and welfare in a model of allocative inefficiency," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 123(3), pages 277-298, April.
    17. Grossmann, Martin, 2014. "Uncertain contest success function," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 134-148.
    18. Hurley, Terrance M. & Shogren, Jason F., 1998. "Asymmetric information contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 645-665, November.
    19. Sebagh Thierry, 1995. "Recherche De Rente : Jeu de Guerre et Guerre D'enjeux - II," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 6(2-3), pages 1-20, June.
    20. Segev, Ella & Sela, Aner, 2011. "Sequential All-Pay Auctions with Head Starts," CEPR Discussion Papers 8183, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    21. Ella Segev & Aner Sela, 2014. "Sequential all-pay auctions with head starts," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(4), pages 893-923, December.
    22. Hurley, Terrance M. & Shogren, Jason F., 1997. "Environmental Conflicts and the SLAPP," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 253-273, July.

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