Economies of scope and scale in green advocacy
Environmental advocacy is a large and growing activity. Whilst a number of economists have analysed the advocacy process, no systematic attempt has been made to understand the factors influencing the organisation of the sector. We explore the relationship between economies of scale and scope in advocacy. Under the most popular specification of a Tullock-type contest, economies of scope arise when (and only when) the scale of that activity is sufficiently large. The incentives for merger are socially efficient, implying no need for policy intervention. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005
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Volume (Year): 124 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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