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Endogenous Timing in the Presence of Non-Monotonicities

Author

Listed:
  • Magnus Hoffmann

    (TUB - Technical University of Berlin / Technische Universität Berlin)

  • Grégoire Rota-Graziosi

    (CERDI - Centre d'Études et de Recherches sur le Développement International - IRD - Institut de Recherche pour le Développement - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UCA - Université Clermont Auvergne)

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to generalize the endogenous timing game proposed by Hamilton and Slutsky (Games and Economic Behavior, 1990, 2, pp. 29–46) by allowing the payoff or the marginal payoff of a player to become non‐monotonic with respect to the strategy of the opponent. We propose a taxonomy of the subgame‐perfect Nash equilibria based on the characteristics of the payoff functions proposed by Eaton (Canadian Journal of Economics, 2004, 37, pp. 805–29). We determine under which conditions of the initial payoff functions commitment has a social value and when the simultaneous‐move Nash equilibrium is commitment robust and discuss its Pareto efficiency. Jeu à séquences endogènes en présence de non‐monotonicités. Cet article généralise le jeu à séquences endogènes proposé par Hamilton et Slutsky (Games and Economic Behavior, 1990, 2, 29–46) en considérant que la fonction de paiement et celle de meilleure réponse de chaque joueur sont non monotones dans la stratégie de l’autre joueur. Nous proposons une taxonomie des équilibres de Nash parfaits en sous‐jeux à partir des caractéristiques des fonctions de paiements définies par Eaton (Canadian Journal of Economics, 2004, 37, 805–29). Nous déterminons sous quelles conditions sur les fonctions de paiements : un engagement a une valeur sociale; l’équilibre de Nash du jeu simultané est robuste à l’engagement; et cet équilibre est efficace au sens de Pareto.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Magnus Hoffmann & Grégoire Rota-Graziosi, 2020. "Endogenous Timing in the Presence of Non-Monotonicities," Post-Print hal-02056492, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02056492
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-02056492v1
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    Cited by:

    1. Kyung Hwan Baik & Jong Hwa Lee & Seokho Lee, 2022. "Endogenous timing in three-player Tullock contests," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(3), pages 495-523, October.
    2. Hörtnagl, Tanja & Kerschbamer, Rudolf & Stracke, Rudi, 2019. "Competing for market shares: Does the order of moves matter even when it shouldn’t?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 346-365.
    3. Ohnishi, Kazuhiro, 2024. "Endogenous timing in a mixed triopoly with state-owned, labour-managed and capitalist firms," MPRA Paper 123007, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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