IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Revisiting environmental groups and members’ behaviour: budget, size and (im)pure altruism

  • Elias Asproudis

    ()

Registered author(s):

    No abstract is available for this item.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10018-011-0009-z
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Article provided by Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS in its journal Environmental Economics and Policy Studies.

    Volume (Year): 13 (2011)
    Issue (Month): 2 (June)
    Pages: 139-156

    as
    in new window

    Handle: RePEc:spr:envpol:v:13:y:2011:i:2:p:139-156
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.seeps.org/
    Email:


    More information through EDIRC

    Order Information: Web: http://link.springer.de/orders.htm

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as in new window
    1. Pim Heijnen & Lambert Schoonbeek, 2008. "Environmental groups in monopolistic markets," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 39(4), pages 379-396, April.
    2. Per G. Fredriksson & Eric Neumayer & Richard Damania & Scott Gates, 2005. "Environmentalism, democracy, and pollution control," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 630, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    3. Tirole, Jean, 1994. ""A Theory of Collective Reputations" with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality," IDEI Working Papers 38, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    4. Riddel, Mary, 2003. "Candidate eco-labeling and senate campaign contributions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 177-194, March.
    5. Paola Conconi, 2003. "Green Lobbies and Transboundary Pollution in Large Open Economies," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/5837, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    6. Per Fredriksson & Eric Neumayer & Gergely Ujhelyi, 2007. "Kyoto Protocol cooperation: Does government corruption facilitate environmental lobbying?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(1), pages 231-251, October.
    7. Romano, Richard & Yildirim, Huseyin, 2001. "Why charities announce donations: a positive perspective," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(3), pages 423-447, September.
    8. Haag, Matthew & Roger Lagunoff, 2003. "On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 97, Royal Economic Society.
    9. David P. Baron, 2003. "Private Politics," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(1), pages 31-66, 03.
    10. Binder, Seth & Neumayer, Eric, 2005. "Environmental pressure group strength and air pollution: An empirical analysis," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(4), pages 527-538, December.
    11. Hewitt, Julie A & Brown, Daniel K, 2000. " Agency Costs in Environmental Not-for-Profits," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(1-2), pages 163-83, April.
    12. Cropper, Maureen L. & William N. Evans & Stephen J. Berard & Maria M. Ducla-Soares & Paul R. Portney, 1992. "The Determinants of Pesticide Regulation: A Statistical Analysis of EPA Decision Making," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(1), pages 175-97, February.
    13. Timothy J. Feddersen & Thomas W. Gilligan, 2001. "Saints and Markets: Activists and the Supply of Credence Goods," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(1), pages 149-171, 03.
    14. Harbaugh, William T., 1998. "What do donations buy?: A model of philanthropy based on prestige and warm glow," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 269-284, February.
    15. Allard Made & Lambert Schoonbeek, 2009. "Entry Facilitation by Environmental Groups," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 43(4), pages 457-472, August.
    16. Weisbrod, Burton A. & Dominguez, Nestor D., 1986. "Demand for collective goods in private nonprofit markets: Can fundraising expenditures help overcome free-rider behavior?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 83-96, June.
    17. Johansson-Stenman, Olof, 2004. "Global environmental problems, efficiency and limited altruism," Working Papers in Economics 139, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
    18. James, Estelle, 1982. "The nonprofit sector in international perspective: The case of Sri Lanka," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 99-129, June.
    19. Graichen, Patrick R & Requate, Till & Dijkstra, Bouwe R, 2001. " How to Win the Political Contest: A Monopolist vs. Environmentalists," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 108(3-4), pages 273-93, September.
    20. Julie Hewitt & Daniel Brown, 2000. "Agency Costs in Environmental Not-For-Profits," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(1), pages 163-183, April.
    21. Susan Rose-Ackerman, 1996. "Altruism, Nonprofits, and Economic Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(2), pages 701-728, June.
    22. David P. Baron & Daniel Diermeier, 2007. "Strategic Activism and Nonmarket Strategy," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(3), pages 599-634, 09.
    23. Khalil, Elias L., 2004. "What is altruism?," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 97-123, February.
    24. Rose-Ackerman, Susan, 1982. "Charitable Giving and "Excessive" Fundraising," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 97(2), pages 193-212, May.
    25. Nalebuff, B. & Caplin, A., 1992. "Competition Among Institutions," Discussion Papers 1992_36, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
    26. Harbaugh, William T, 1998. "The Prestige Motive for Making Charitable Transfers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 277-82, May.
    27. Stratmann, Thomas, 1992. "Are Contributions Rational? Untangling Strategies of Political Action Committees," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 647-64, June.
    28. Elinor Ostrom, 2000. "Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 137-158, Summer.
    29. Colin F. Camerer & George Loewenstein & Drazen Prelec, 2004. "Neuroeconomics: Why Economics Needs Brains," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 106(3), pages 555-579, October.
    30. Becker, Gary S, 1974. "A Theory of Social Interactions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(6), pages 1063-93, Nov.-Dec..
    31. Charles F. Manski, 2000. "Economic Analysis of Social Interactions," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 115-136, Summer.
    32. Khanna, Jyoti & Posnett, John & Sandler, Todd, 1995. "Charity donations in the UK: New evidence based on panel data," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 257-272, February.
    33. Becker, Gary S, 1983. "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August.
    34. Paul Pecorino, 2009. "Public goods, group size, and the degree of rivalry," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 138(1), pages 161-169, January.
    35. Robert Innes, 2006. "A Theory of Consumer Boycotts under Symmetric Information and Imperfect Competition," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(511), pages 355-381, 04.
    36. Potters, Jan & Sloof, Randolph, 1996. "Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 403-442, November.
    37. Posnett, John & Sandler, Todd, 1989. "Demand for charity donations in private non-profit markets : The case of the U.K," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 187-200, November.
    38. Fredriksson, Per G., 1997. "The Political Economy of Pollution Taxes in a Small Open Economy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 44-58, May.
    39. Johansson-Stenman, Olof & Martinsson, Peter, 2006. "Honestly, why are you driving a BMW?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 129-146, June.
    40. Werner Neu, 2008. "Making economic sense of brain models: a survey and interpretation of the literature," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 165-192, August.
    41. Khalil, Elias L., 2004. "What is altruism? A reply to critics," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 141-143, February.
    42. Andreoni, James, 1989. "Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1447-58, December.
    43. Tullberg, Jan, 2006. "Group egoism; investigating collective action and individual rationality," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 35(6), pages 1014-1031, December.
    44. Glazer, Amihai & Konrad, Kai A, 1996. "A Signaling Explanation for Charity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 1019-28, September.
    45. Jon Elster, 1998. "Emotions and Economic Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 47-74, March.
    46. Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard, 1999. " U.S. Interest Groups Prefer Emission Trading: A New Perspective," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 101(1-2), pages 109-28, October.
    47. Anthony Heyes & Catherine Liston-Heyes, 2005. "Economies of scope and scale in green advocacy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 423-436, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:envpol:v:13:y:2011:i:2:p:139-156. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn)

    or (Christopher F Baum)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.