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The Role of United Charities in Fundraising: The Case of Singapore

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  • Vincent C.H. Chua
  • Chung Ming Wong

Abstract

Theory suggests that a united charity helps to economize on fundraising costs by reducing competition for donations among member charities. However, donors often cannot control the allocation of their donations, and charities may dislike the monitoring of their activities. This paper examines these and other issues relating to the Community Chest of Singapore. The results, based on analysis of financial positions and fundraising costs of a large number of charities, suggest that the Community Chest does possess important fundraising advantages. Thus charities in financial difficulties or in need of funds for additional programs tend to seek membership. However, organizations that value their autonomy and independence, and that are able to achieve low fundraising costs tend to remain as non‐members. Thus a monopoly agency raising funds for all charities in the future is unlikely in the case of Singapore.

Suggested Citation

  • Vincent C.H. Chua & Chung Ming Wong, 2003. "The Role of United Charities in Fundraising: The Case of Singapore," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 74(3), pages 433-464, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:annpce:v:74:y:2003:i:3:p:433-464
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-8292.00230
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    Cited by:

    1. Murat C. Mungan & Bariş K. Yörük, 2012. "Fundraising and Optimal Policy Rules," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 14(4), pages 625-652, August.
    2. Reinstein David A, 2011. "Does One Charitable Contribution Come at the Expense of Another?," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-54, June.
    3. Crettez, Bertrand & Hayek, Naila & Zaccour, Georges, 2020. "Do charities spend more on their social programs when they cooperate than when they compete?," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 283(3), pages 1055-1063.
    4. Reinstein, David, 2006. "Does One Contribution Come at the Expense of Another? Empirical Evidence on Substitution Between Charitable Donations," Economics Discussion Papers 2938, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
    5. José Miguel Tirado-Beltrán & Iluminada Fuertes-Fuertes & J. David Cabedo, 2020. "Donor Reaction to Non-Financial Information Covering Social Projects in Nonprofits: A Spanish Case," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(23), pages 1-17, December.

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