Environmentalism, democracy, and pollution control
This paper makes two empirical contributions to the literature, based on predictions generated by a lobby group model. First, we investigate how environmental lobby groups affect the determination of environmental policy in rich and developing countries. Second, we explore the interaction between democratic participation and political (electoral) competition. The empirical findings suggest that environmental lobby groups tend to positively affect the stringency of environmental policy. Moreover, political competition tends to raise policy stringency, in particular where citizens’ participation in the democratic process is widespread.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 1999.
"The Quality of Government,"
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization,
Oxford University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 222-79, April.
- Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "The Quality of Government," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1847, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, . "The Quality of Government," Working Paper 19452, Harvard University OpenScholar.
- Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 1998. "The Quality of Goverment," NBER Working Papers 6727, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Dutt, Pushan & Mitra, Devashish, 2002. "Endogenous trade policy through majority voting: an empirical investigation," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 107-133, October.
- Conconi, Paola, 2003.
"Green lobbies and transboundary pollution in large open economies,"
Journal of International Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 399-422, March.
- Paola Conconi, 2003. "Green Lobbies and Transboundary Pollution in Large Open Economies," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/5837, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Eric Neumayer, 2002. "Does Trade Openness Promote Multilateral Environmental Cooperation?," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(6), pages 815-832, 06.
- Murdoch, James C & Sandler, Todd & Sargent, Keith, 1997. "A Tale of Two Collectives: Sulphur versus Nitrogen Oxides Emission Reduction in Europe," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 64(254), pages 281-301, May.
- Davidson, Russell & MacKinnon, James G., 1993. "Estimation and Inference in Econometrics," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195060119, March.
- Congleton, Roger D, 1992. "Political Institutions and Pollution Control," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 74(3), pages 412-21, August.
- Stengos, T. & Millimet, D.L. & List, J.A., 2002.
"The Environmental Kuznets Curve: Real Progress or Misspecified Models?,"
2002-13, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
- Daniel L. Millimet & John A. List & Thanasis Stengos, 2003. "The Environmental Kuznets Curve: Real Progress or Misspecified Models?," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 85(4), pages 1038-1047, November.
- Damania, Richard & Fredriksson, Per G. & List, John A., 2003. "Trade liberalization, corruption, and environmental policy formation: theory and evidence," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 490-512, November.
- Conconi, P., 2000. "Green and Producer Lobbies: Enemies or Allies?," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 570, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Gene Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1994.
"Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics,"
NBER Working Papers
4877, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1996. "Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(2), pages 265-86, April.
- Dennis C. Mueller & Thomas Stratmann, 2002.
"The Economic Effects of Democratic Participation,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
656, CESifo Group Munich.
- Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992.
"Protection for Sale,"
21-92, Tel Aviv.
- Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1992. "Protection For Sale," NBER Working Papers 4149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Grossman, Gene & Helpman, Elhanan, 1993. "Protection for Sale," CEPR Discussion Papers 827, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers 162, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
- Martin C. McGuire & Mancur Olson Jr., 1996. "The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(1), pages 72-96, March.
- Miller, Tracy C., 1991. "Agricultural price policies and political interest group competition," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 489-513.
- Riddel, Mary, 2003. "Candidate eco-labeling and senate campaign contributions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 177-194, March.
- Giovanni Maggi & Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg, 1999.
"Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1135-1155, December.
- Fredriksson, Per G., 1997. "The Political Economy of Pollution Taxes in a Small Open Economy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 44-58, May.
- Hilton, F. G. Hank & Levinson, Arik, 1998. "Factoring the Environmental Kuznets Curve: Evidence from Automotive Lead Emissions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 126-141, March.
- Aidt, Toke S., 1998. "Political internalization of economic externalities and environmental policy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 1-16, July.
- Kishore Gawande & Usree Bandyopadhyay, 2000. "Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 82(1), pages 139-152, February.
- Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31, February.
- Trefler, Daniel, 1993. "Trade Liberalization and the Theory of Endogenous Protection: An Econometric Study of U.S. Import Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(1), pages 138-60, February.
- Shogren, Jason F. & Durden, G. C. & Silberman, J., 1991. "Effect of Interest Group Pressure on Coal Strip Mining Legislation (The)," Staff General Research Papers 357, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Cropper, Maureen L. & William N. Evans & Stephen J. Berard & Maria M. Ducla-Soares & Paul R. Portney, 1992. "The Determinants of Pesticide Regulation: A Statistical Analysis of EPA Decision Making," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(1), pages 175-97, February.
- Potters, Jan & Sloof, Randolph, 1996.
"Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence,"
European Journal of Political Economy,
Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 403-442, November.
- Potters, J.J.M. & Sloof, R., 1996. "Interest groups : A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence," Other publications TiSEM ff27d5d8-f584-4386-a1fc-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2002. "Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262661314, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:49:y:2005:i:2:p:343-365. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.