The Dynamics of Lobbying under Uncertainty: On Political Liberalization in Arab Countries
We consider a framework à la Wirl (1994) where political liberalization is the outcome of a lobbying differential game between a conservative elite and a reformist group, the former player pushing against political liberalization in opposition to the latter. In contrast to the benchmark model, we introduce uncertainty. We consider the typical case of an Arab oil exporter country where oil rents are fiercely controlled by the conservative elite. We assume that the higher the oil rents, the more reluctant to political liberalization the elite is. Two states of nature are considered (high vs low resource rents). We then compute the Market-perfect equilibria of the corresponding piecewise deterministic differential game. It is shown that introducing uncertainty in this manner increases the set of strategies compared to Wirl's original setting. In particular, it is shown that the cost of lobbying might be significantly increased under uncertainty with respect to the benchmark. This ultimately highlights some specificities of the political liberalization at stake in Arab countries and the associated risks.
|Date of creation:||Mar 2013|
|Date of revision:|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00801961|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Raouf BOUCEKKINE & Rafik BOUKLIA-HASSANE, 2011. "Rente, corruption et violence : l’émergence d’un ordre nouveau dans les pays arabes ?," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 92, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- Linster, Bruce G, 1994. " Cooperative Rent-Seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 81(1-2), pages 23-34, October.
- Halvor Mehlum & Karl Ove Moene & Ragnar Torvik, 2005.
"Cursed by resources or institutions?,"
Working Paper Series
5705, Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology.
- Gylfason, Thorvaldur, 2000.
"Natural Resources, Education, and Economic Development,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
2594, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Gylfason, Thorvaldur, 2001. "Natural resources, education, and economic development," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 847-859, May.
- Francesco Caselli & Tom Cunningham, 2009.
"Leader behaviour and the natural resource curse,"
Oxford Economic Papers,
Oxford University Press, vol. 61(4), pages 628-650, October.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00801961. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.