The Dynamics of Lobbying under Uncertainty: On Political Liberalization in Arab Countries
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Raouf Boucekkine & Fabien Prieur & Klarizze Puzon, 2014. "The Dynamics of Lobbying under Uncertainty: On Political Liberalization in Arab Countries," Post-Print hal-01474428, HAL.
- Raouf Boucekkine & Fabien Prieur & Klarizze Puzon, 2013. "The Dynamics of Lobbying under Uncertainty: On Political Liberalization in Arab Countries," AMSE Working Papers 1317, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, Marseille, France.
References listed on IDEAS
- Halvor Mehlum & Karl Moene & Ragnar Torvik, 2006. "Cursed by Resources or Institutions?," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(8), pages 1117-1131, August.
- Gylfason, Thorvaldur, 2001.
"Natural resources, education, and economic development,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 847-859, May.
- Gylfason, Thorvaldur, 2000. "Natural Resources, Education, and Economic Development," CEPR Discussion Papers 2594, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Raouf BOUCEKKINE & Rafik BOUKLIA-HASSANE, 2011. "Rente, corruption et violence : l’émergence d’un ordre nouveau dans les pays arabes ?," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 92, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- Linster, Bruce G, 1994. "Cooperative Rent-Seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 81(1-2), pages 23-34, October.
- Francesco Caselli & Tom Cunningham, 2009. "Leader behaviour and the natural resource curse," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 61(4), pages 628-650, October.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Driouchi, Ahmed, 2014. "Testing of Natural Resources as Blessing or Curse to the Knowledge Economy in Arab Countries," MPRA Paper 58598, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Raouf Boucekkine & Fabien Prieur & Benteng Zou, 2015. "Institutional dynamics under revenue volatility and revenue-dependent lobbying power: A stochastic differential game approach," CREA Discussion Paper Series 15-08, Center for Research in Economic Analysis, University of Luxembourg.
- Raouf Boucekkine & Fabien Prieur & Benteng Zou, 2015.
"Symmetric vs Asymmetric Equilibria and Stochastic Stability in a Dynamic Game of Legislative Lobbying,"
AMSE Working Papers
1531, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, Marseille, France, revised Jan 2018.
- Raouf Boucekkine & Fabien Prieur & Benteng Zou, 2018. "Symmetric vs Asymmetric Equilibria and Stochastic Stability in a Dynamic Game of Legislative Lobbying," Working Papers halshs-01181214, HAL.
- Raouf Boucekkine & Fabien Prieur & Benteng Zou, 2018. "Symmetric vs asymmetric equilibria and stochastic stability in a dynamic game of legislative lobbying," CREA Discussion Paper Series 18-03, Center for Research in Economic Analysis, University of Luxembourg.
More about this item
KeywordsRent-seeking; lobbying; natural resources; Arab countries; piecewise deterministic differential games;
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-04-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-ARA-2013-04-06 (MENA - Middle East & North Africa)
- NEP-ENE-2013-04-06 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-POL-2013-04-06 (Positive Political Economics)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00801961. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.