The Dynamics of Lobbying under Uncertainty: On Political Liberalization in Arab Countries
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- Raouf Boucekkine & Fabien Prieur & Klarizze Puzon, 2013. "The Dynamics of Lobbying under Uncertainty: On Political Liberalization in Arab Countries," Working Papers halshs-00801961, HAL.
- Raouf Boucekkine & Fabien Prieur & Klarizze Puzon, 2014. "The Dynamics of Lobbying under Uncertainty: On Political Liberalization in Arab Countries," Post-Print hal-01474428, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
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"Natural resources, education, and economic development,"
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- Raouf BOUCEKKINE & Rafik BOUKLIA-HASSANE, 2011. "Rente, corruption et violence : l’émergence d’un ordre nouveau dans les pays arabes ?," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 92, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- Halvor Mehlum & Karl Moene & Ragnar Torvik, 2006. "Cursed by Resources or Institutions?," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(8), pages 1117-1131, August.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Driouchi, Ahmed, 2014. "Testing of Natural Resources as Blessing or Curse to the Knowledge Economy in Arab Countries," MPRA Paper 58598, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Raouf Boucekkine & Fabien Prieur & Benteng Zou, 2015.
"Symmetric vs Asymmetric Equilibria and Stochastic Stability in a Dynamic Game of Legislative Lobbying,"
AMSE Working Papers
1531, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, Marseille, France, revised Jan 2018.
- Raouf Boucekkine & Fabien Prieur & Benteng Zou, 2018. "Symmetric vs Asymmetric Equilibria and Stochastic Stability in a Dynamic Game of Legislative Lobbying," Working Papers halshs-01181214, HAL.
- Raouf Boucekkine & Fabien Prieur & Benteng Zou, 2018. "Symmetric vs asymmetric equilibria and stochastic stability in a dynamic game of legislative lobbying," CREA Discussion Paper Series 18-03, Center for Research in Economic Analysis, University of Luxembourg.
- Raouf Boucekkine & Fabien Prieur & Benteng Zou, 2015. "Institutional dynamics under revenue volatility and revenue-dependent lobbying power: A stochastic differential game approach," CREA Discussion Paper Series 15-08, Center for Research in Economic Analysis, University of Luxembourg.
More about this item
KeywordsRent-seeking; lobbying; natural resources; Arab countries; piecewise deterministic differential games;
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-03-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-ARA-2013-03-30 (MENA - Middle East & North Africa)
- NEP-CDM-2013-03-30 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-ENE-2013-03-30 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2013-03-30 (Game Theory)
- NEP-POL-2013-03-30 (Positive Political Economics)
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