In and Out of Equilibrium: Evolution of Strategies in Repeated Games with Discounting
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- García, Julián & van Veelen, Matthijs, 2016. "In and out of equilibrium I: Evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 161-189.
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Cited by:
- van Veelen, Matthijs & García, Julián, 2019.
"In and out of equilibrium II: Evolution in repeated games with discounting and complexity costs,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 113-130.
- Matthijs van Veelen & Julian Garcia, 2012. "In and out of Equilibrium II: Evolution in Repeated Games with Discounting and Complexity Costs," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-089/I, Tinbergen Institute.
- Heller, Yuval, 2015.
"Three steps ahead,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(1), January.
- Heller, Yuval, 2012. "Three steps ahead," MPRA Paper 40714, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Heller, Yuval, 2012. "Three steps ahead," MPRA Paper 39429, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Akdeniz, Aslıhan & van Veelen, Matthijs, 2023. "Evolution and the ultimatum game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 570-612.
- Jonathan Newton, 2018. "Evolutionary Game Theory: A Renaissance," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(2), pages 1-67, May.
- Gao, Yan & Li, Minlan & Hu, Yuanyuan & Wang, Rui-Wu & Wang, Chao, 2024. "Evolutionary dynamics in voluntary prisoner’s dilemma game with environmental feedbacks," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 181(C).
- Shun Kurokawa & Joe Yuichiro Wakano & Yasuo Ihara, 2018. "Evolution of Groupwise Cooperation: Generosity, Paradoxical Behavior, and Non-Linear Payoff Functions," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(4), pages 1-24, December.
- García, Julián & van Veelen, Matthijs, 2016.
"In and out of equilibrium I: Evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 161-189.
- Matthijs van Veelen & Julian Garcia, 2010. "In and Out of Equilibrium: Evolution of Strategies in Repeated Games with Discounting," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 10-037/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Matthijs van Veelen, 2020. "The evolution of morality," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 20-063/I, Tinbergen Institute.
- Izquierdo, Luis R. & Izquierdo, Segismundo S. & Sandholm, William H., 2019. "An introduction to ABED: Agent-based simulation of evolutionary game dynamics," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 434-462.
- Maria Kleshnina & Christian Hilbe & Štěpán Šimsa & Krishnendu Chatterjee & Martin A. Nowak, 2023. "The effect of environmental information on evolution of cooperation in stochastic games," Nature Communications, Nature, vol. 14(1), pages 1-11, December.
- Benjamin M Zagorsky & Johannes G Reiter & Krishnendu Chatterjee & Martin A Nowak, 2013. "Forgiver Triumphs in Alternating Prisoner's Dilemma," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 8(12), pages 1-8, December.
- Saral, Ali Seyhun, 2020. "Evolution of Conditional Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma," OSF Preprints wcpkz, Center for Open Science.
- Matthijs van Veelen & Benjamin Allen & Moshe Hoffman & Burton Simon & Carl Veller, 2016. "Inclusive Fitness," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 16-055/I, Tinbergen Institute.
- Peter S. Park & Martin A. Nowak & Christian Hilbe, 2022. "Cooperation in alternating interactions with memory constraints," Nature Communications, Nature, vol. 13(1), pages 1-11, December.
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Keywords
Repeated games; evolution; robust against indirect invasions; simulation;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
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