Evolutionary Stability and Lexographic Preferences
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- Samuelson, Larry & Swinkels, Jeroen M., 2003. "Evolutionary stability and lexicographic preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 332-342, August.
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- Yuval Heller, 2014. "Language, Meaning, and Games: A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(6), pages 1857-1863, June.
- Matthijs van Veelen, 2007. "Evolution of Strategies in Repeated Games with Discounting," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-115/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- van Veelen, Matthijs & García, Julián, 2019.
"In and out of equilibrium II: Evolution in repeated games with discounting and complexity costs,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 113-130.
- Matthijs van Veelen & Julian Garcia, 2012. "In and out of Equilibrium II: Evolution in Repeated Games with Discounting and Complexity Costs," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-089/I, Tinbergen Institute.
- Stefano Demichelis & Jorgen W. Weibull, 2008.
"Language, Meaning, and Games: A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1292-1311, September.
- Stefano Demichelis & Jörgen W. Weibull, 2007. "Language, meaning and games: a model of communication, coordination and evolution," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 61, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
- Stefano Demichelis & Jörgen Weibull, 2009. "Language, meaning and games A model of communication, coordination and evolution," Working Papers hal-00354224, HAL.
- Demichelis, Stefano & Weibull, Jörgen, 2006. "Efficiency, communication and honesty," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 645, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 28 Nov 2006.
- Luciano Andreozzi, 2010. "Trust is bound to emerge (In the repeated Trust Game)," Department of Economics Working Papers 1008, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
- Shahi, Chander & Kant, Shashi, 2007. "An evolutionary game-theoretic approach to the strategies of community members under Joint Forest Management regime," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(7), pages 763-775, April.
- García, Julián & van Veelen, Matthijs, 2016.
"In and out of equilibrium I: Evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 161-189.
- Matthijs van Veelen & Julian Garcia, 2010. "In and Out of Equilibrium: Evolution of Strategies in Repeated Games with Discounting," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 10-037/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Heller, Yuval, 2013. "Language, Meaning, and Games: Comment," MPRA Paper 49375, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Andreozzi, Luciano, 2013. "Evolutionary stability in repeated extensive games played by finite automata," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 67-74.
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