IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v104y2014i6p1857-63.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Language, Meaning, and Games: A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution: Comment

Author

Listed:
  • Yuval Heller

Abstract

Demichelis & Weibull (AER 2008) show that adding lexicographic lying costs to coordination games with cheap talk yields a sharp prediction: only the efficient outcome is evolutionarily stable. I show that this result is caused by the discontinuity of preferences rather than by small lying costs per se. Finally, I discuss why discontinuity may not be an appealing assumption in evolutionary models.

Suggested Citation

  • Yuval Heller, 2014. "Language, Meaning, and Games: A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(6), pages 1857-1863, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:104:y:2014:i:6:p:1857-63
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.6.1857
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.104.6.1857
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ds/10406/20131149_ds.zip
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Samuelson, Larry & Swinkels, Jeroen M., 2003. "Evolutionary stability and lexicographic preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 332-342, August.
    2. Binmore, Kenneth G. & Samuelson, Larry, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 278-305, August.
    3. Cressman, R., 1997. "Local stability of smooth selection dynamics for normal form games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 1-19, August.
    4. Nachbar, J H, 1990. ""Evolutionary" Selection Dynamics in Games: Convergence and Limit Properties," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 19(1), pages 59-89.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Suzuki, Toru, 2020. "Efficient communication and indexicality," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 156-165.
    2. Uriarte Ayo, José Ramón, 2015. "A Game-Theoreteic Analysis of Minority Language Use in Multilingual Societies," IKERLANAK info:eu-repo/grantAgreeme, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
    3. Heller, Yuval & Sturrock, David, 2020. "Promises and endogenous reneging costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
    4. Jonathan Newton, 2018. "Evolutionary Game Theory: A Renaissance," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(2), pages 1-67, May.
    5. Melody Lo, 2021. "Language and coordination games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(1), pages 49-92, July.
    6. Heller, Yuval & Sturrock, David, 2017. "Promises and Endogenous Reneging Costs," MPRA Paper 78803, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Naono, Miharu, 2022. "Cost heterogeneity and the persistence of bilingualism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 325-339.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Heller, Yuval, 2013. "Language, Meaning, and Games: Comment," MPRA Paper 49375, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. , & , H. & ,, 2015. "Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(1), January.
    3. Abhijit Banerjee & Jörgen W. Weibull & Ken Binmore, 1996. "Evolution and Rationality: Some Recent Game-Theoretic Results," International Economic Association Series, in: Beth Allen (ed.), Economics in a Changing World, chapter 4, pages 90-117, Palgrave Macmillan.
    4. Sivan Frenkel & Yuval Heller & Roee Teper, 2018. "The Endowment Effect As Blessing," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(3), pages 1159-1186, August.
    5. Jonathan Bendor & Piotr Swistak, 1998. "Evolutionary Equilibria: Characterization Theorems and Their Implications," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 45(2), pages 99-159, October.
    6. van Veelen, Matthijs & García, Julián, 2019. "In and out of equilibrium II: Evolution in repeated games with discounting and complexity costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 113-130.
    7. Demichelis, Stefano & Weibull, Jörgen, 2006. "Efficiency, communication and honesty," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 645, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 28 Nov 2006.
    8. García, Julián & van Veelen, Matthijs, 2016. "In and out of equilibrium I: Evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 161-189.
    9. Cressman, R., 2000. "Subgame Monotonicity in Extensive Form Evolutionary Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 183-205, August.
    10. Stefano Demichelis & Jorgen W. Weibull, 2008. "Language, Meaning, and Games: A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1292-1311, September.
    11. Weibull, Jörgen W., 1992. "An Introduction to Evolutionary Game Theory," Working Paper Series 347, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    12. Matthijs van Veelen, 2007. "Evolution of Strategies in Repeated Games with Discounting," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-115/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    13. Amann, Erwin & Yang, Chun-Lei, 1998. "Sophistication and the persistence of cooperation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 91-105, September.
    14. Sandholm, William H., 2015. "Population Games and Deterministic Evolutionary Dynamics," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    15. Roee Teper, 2014. "The Endowment Effect as a Blessing," Working Paper 5862, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.
    16. Andreozzi, Luciano, 2013. "Evolutionary stability in repeated extensive games played by finite automata," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 67-74.
    17. Weibull, Jörgen W., 1997. "What have we learned from Evolutionary Game Theory so far?," Working Paper Series 487, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 26 Oct 1998.
    18. Dawid, Herbert, 1999. "On the stability of monotone discrete selection dynamics with inertia," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 265-280, May.
    19. Cristina Bicchieri & Ryan Muldoon & Alessandro Sontuoso, 2018. "Social Norms," PPE Working Papers 0015, Philosophy, Politics and Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    20. Luciano Andreozzi, 2010. "Trust is bound to emerge (In the repeated Trust Game)," Department of Economics Working Papers 1008, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:104:y:2014:i:6:p:1857-63. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Michael P. Albert (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/aeaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.