Subgame Monotonicity in Extensive Form Evolutionary Games
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- Cressman, R. & Schlag, K. H., 1998.
"The Dynamic (In)Stability of Backwards Induction,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 260-285, December.
- R. Cressman & K.H. Schlag, "undated". "The Dynamic (In)Stability of Backwards Induction," ELSE working papers 027, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
- R. Cressman, K.H. Schlag, 1995. "The Dynamic (In)Stability of Backwards Induction," Discussion Paper Serie B 347, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Selten, Reinhard, 1983. "Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 269-363, September.
- Samuelson, Larry & Zhang, Jianbo, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 363-391, August.
- Gale, John & Binmore, Kenneth G. & Samuelson, Larry, 1995. "Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 56-90.
- Cressman, R., 1997. "Local stability of smooth selection dynamics for normal form games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 1-19, August.
- Nachbar, J H, 1990. ""Evolutionary" Selection Dynamics in Games: Convergence and Limit Properties," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 19(1), pages 59-89. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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