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Evolution, Rationality and Equilibrium in Games

Author

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  • Weibull, Jörgen W.

    (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN))

Abstract

Evolutionary game theory studies the robustness of strategy profiles and sets of strategy profiles with respect to evolutionary forces in games played repeatedly in large populations of boundedly rational agents. The approach is macro oriented in the sense of focusing on the strategy distribution in the interacting population(s). Some main features of this approach are here outlined, and connections with learning models and standard notions of game-theoretic rationality and equilibrium are discussed. Some desiderata and results for robust long-run predictions are considered.

Suggested Citation

  • Weibull, Jörgen W., 1997. "Evolution, Rationality and Equilibrium in Games," Working Paper Series 489, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0489
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    2. Li-cai Lei & Shang Gao & En-yu Zeng, 2020. "Regulation strategies of ride-hailing market in China: an evolutionary game theoretic perspective," Electronic Commerce Research, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 535-563, September.
    3. Dehai Liu & Hongyi Li & Weiguo Wang & Chuang Zhou, 2015. "Scenario forecast model of long term trends in rural labor transfer based on evolutionary games," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 649-670, July.
    4. Accinelli, E. & Giombini, G. & Muñiz, H. & Owen, L. & Policardo, L. & Carrera, E.J. Sánchez, 2025. "On the game of going green: How do consumers, firms, and banks struggle to escape environmental traps?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 180(C).
    5. Eckel, Catherine C., 2004. "Vernon Smith: economics as a laboratory science," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 15-28, March.
    6. Olga A. Rud & Jean Paul Rabanal, 2018. "Evolution of markets: a simulation with centralized, decentralized and posted offer formats," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 667-689, August.
    7. Mari Rege, 1999. "Social Norms and Private Provision of Public Goods: Endogenous Peer Groups," Discussion Papers 257, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
    8. Tilman Slembeck, 1999. "A Behavioral Approach to Learning in Economics - Towards an Economic Theory of Contingent Learning," Microeconomics 9905001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Andreas Flache & Michael W. Macy, 2002. "Stochastic Collusion and the Power Law of Learning," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 46(5), pages 629-653, October.
    10. Xu, Bo & Wang, Ying & Han, Yu & He, Yuchang & Wang, Ziwei, 2021. "Interaction patterns and coordination in two population groups: A dynamic perspective," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 142(C).
    11. Shitao Gong & Xin Gao & Zhou Li & Linyan Chen, 2021. "Developing a Dynamic Supervision Mechanism to Improve Construction Safety Investment Supervision Efficiency in China: Theoretical Simulation of Evolutionary Game Process," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 18(7), pages 1-29, March.
    12. Gianluca Iannucci & Jean-Christophe Pereau, 2024. "The dynamics of organic farming conversion in groundwater management," Post-Print hal-05155879, HAL.
    13. Emanuela Migliaccio & Thierry Verdier, 2018. "On the Spatial Diffusion of Cooperation with Endogenous Matching Institutions," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(3), pages 1-27, August.
    14. Agnès Festré, 2010. "Incentives And Social Norms: A Motivation‐Based Economic Analysis Of Social Norms," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(3), pages 511-538, July.
    15. Zhang, Hao & Wang, Mingyue & Cheng, Zhixuan & Wan, Ling, 2020. "Technology-sharing strategy and incentive mechanism for R&D teams of manufacturing enterprises," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 555(C).

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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