Language, Meaning, and Games: Comment
Demichelis and Weibull (2008 AER) show that adding lexicographic lying costs to coordination games with cheap talk yields a sharp prediction: only the efficient outcome is evolutionarily stable. I demonstrate that this result is caused by the discontinuity of preferences, rather than by small lying costs per se.
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