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Cheap Talk and Evolutionary Dynamics

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  • K. Schlag

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  • K. Schlag, 2010. "Cheap Talk and Evolutionary Dynamics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 541, David K. Levine.
    • Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:541
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    File URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4541.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Warneryd, Karl, 1991. "Evolutionary stability in unanimity games with cheap talk," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 375-378, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Heller, Yuval & Mohlin, Erik, 2019. "Coevolution of deception and preferences: Darwin and Nash meet Machiavelli," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 223-247.
    2. Sjaak Hurkens & Karl H. Schlag, 1999. "Communication, coordination and efficiency in evolutionary one-population models," Economics Working Papers 387, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    3. Weibull, Jörgen W., 1997. "What have we learned from Evolutionary Game Theory so far?," Working Paper Series 487, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 26 Oct 1998.
    4. Jonathan Newton, 2018. "Evolutionary Game Theory: A Renaissance," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(2), pages 1-67, May.
    5. Banerjee, Abhijit & Weibull, Jörgen W., 1996. "Neutrally Stable Outcomes in Cheap Talk Games," Working Paper Series 450, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    6. Brian Skyrms, 2003. "Signals, Evolution and the Explanatory Power of Transient Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000799, David K. Levine.
    7. Jäger, Gerhard & Koch-Metzger, Lars & Riedel, Frank, 2011. "Voronoi languages. Equilibria in cheap-talk games with high-dimensional types and few signals," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 420, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    8. Stefano Demichelis & Jorgen W. Weibull, 2008. "Language, Meaning, and Games: A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1292-1311, September.
    9. Karl H. Schlag, "undated". "When Does Evolution Lead to Efficiency in Communication Games?," ELSE working papers 026, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
    10. Heller, Yuval & Mohlin, Erik, 2015. "Stable Observable Behavior," MPRA Paper 63013, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Förster, Manuel & Riedel, Frank, 2016. "Distorted Voronoi languages," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 458, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    12. Heller, Yuval, 2013. "Language, Meaning, and Games: Comment," MPRA Paper 49375, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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