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Social interaction and negotiation outcomes: An experimental approach

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  • Brañas-Garza, Pablo
  • Cabrales, Antonio
  • Mateu, Guillermo
  • Sánchez, Angel
  • Sutan, Angela

Abstract

We study experimentally the impact of pre-play social interactions on negotiations. We isolate the impact of several common components of interactions: conversations, food, and alcoholic or non-alcoholic beverages. Participants perform a standardized (complex or simple) negotiation under six conditions: without interaction; interaction only; and interactions with water, wine, water and food, and wine and food. We find that none of the treatments improves the outcomes over the treatment without interactions. We also study trust and reciprocity, where we find the same lack of superiority of interaction.

Suggested Citation

  • Brañas-Garza, Pablo & Cabrales, Antonio & Mateu, Guillermo & Sánchez, Angel & Sutan, Angela, 2023. "Social interaction and negotiation outcomes: An experimental approach," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:soceco:v:102:y:2023:i:c:s2214804322001197
    DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2022.101948
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