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Can attentional nudges improve efficiency of bilateral multi-attribute negotiations?

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  • Lamiraud, Karine
  • Patris, Julien
  • Vranceanu, Radu

Abstract

This paper reports the results from a lab experiment to simulate negotiation on innovative therapy commercialization. Using a between-subject design, we analyzed the consequences of two light choice interventions: (1) guiding negotiations towards early wins, and (2) inviting negotiators to share information about their priority goals. In both treatments, the total value created exceeded the control value by approximately 9 % of the maximal value that can be created in this experiment. However, it was essentially the buyer who captured the additional value. We found that, conditional on the success of the negotiation, the total value created increased with the time spent negotiating. Negotiator gender had an impact on the negotiation outcome, with women underperforming compared to men.

Suggested Citation

  • Lamiraud, Karine & Patris, Julien & Vranceanu, Radu, 2024. "Can attentional nudges improve efficiency of bilateral multi-attribute negotiations?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 110(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:soceco:v:110:y:2024:i:c:s2214804324000430
    DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2024.102205
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets

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