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Gender and Negotiation in the Small: Are Women Perceived to Be More Cooperative than Men?

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Abstract

We surveyed research by experimental economists that examines gender differences in negotiation in the context of two simple, two-player games. Our purpose is to uncover empirical regularities in the results that might be useful to teachers or practitioners of negotiation. In the dictator game, one player unilaterally determines the division of a fixed amount of money. In the ultimatum game, one player offers a division and the other must accept or reject that offer; if rejected, both players receive a zero payoff. The results have shown that, on balance, women tend to be more egalitarian than men, to expect and ask for less in the negotiation. Women also seem to be more responsive to the context of a negotiation and are less likely to fail to reach an agreement than men. These differences are small, however, in comparison with differences in expectations about what women and men will do. We conclude that stereotyping is alive and well in negotiations and that this can help or hinder negotiation outcomes, depending on the context.

Suggested Citation

  • Catherine C. Eckel & Angela de Oliveira & Philip J. Grossman, 2008. "Gender and Negotiation in the Small: Are Women Perceived to Be More Cooperative than Men?," Monash Economics Working Papers archive-02, Monash University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:mos:moswps:archive-02
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    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1571-9979.2008.00196.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Grace Villamor & Febrina Desrianti & Ratna Akiefnawati & Sacha Amaruzaman & Meine Noordwijk, 2014. "Gender influences decisions to change land use practices in the tropical forest margins of Jambi, Indonesia," Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, Springer, vol. 19(6), pages 733-755, August.
    2. Bowles, Hannah Riley, 2012. "Psychological Perspectives on Gender in Negotiation," Scholarly Articles 9830358, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
    3. Chew, Soo Hong & Ebstein, Richard P. & Zhong, Songfa, 2013. "Sex-hormone genes and gender difference in ultimatum game: Experimental evidence from China and Israel," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 28-42.
    4. Bowles, Hannah Riley, 2012. "Psychological Perspectives on Gender in Negotiation," Working Paper Series rwp12-046, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    5. Angela A. Stanton, 2010. "Hormonal Influence on Male Decision-making: Implications for Organizational Management," Chapters,in: Neuroeconomics and the Firm, chapter 8 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Eckel, Catherine & Grossman, Philip J. & Johnson, Cathleen A. & de Oliveira, Angela C.M. & Rojas, Christian & Wilson, Rick, 2011. "Social norms of sharing in high school: Teen giving in the dictator game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 80(3), pages 603-612.
    7. Christine L. Exley & Muriel Niederle & Lise Vesterlund, 2016. "Knowing When to Ask: The Cost of Leaning In," NBER Working Papers 22961, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Emmanuel PETIT (GREThA, CNRS, UMR 5113) & Anna TCHERKASSOF (Laboratoire Interuniversitaire de Psychologie. Personnalité, Cognition et Changement Social (LIP/PC2S), Université Pierre Mendès France) & X, 2012. "Sincere Giving and Shame in a Dictator Game," Cahiers du GREThA 2012-25, Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée.
    9. Hammond, Robert G. & Morrill, Thayer, 2016. "Personality traits and bidding behavior in competing auctions," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 39-55.

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