IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/matsoc/v30y1995i3p273-284.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

On the neutral stability of mixed strategies in asymmetric contests

Author

Listed:
  • Bhaskar, V.

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Bhaskar, V., 1995. "On the neutral stability of mixed strategies in asymmetric contests," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 273-284, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:30:y:1995:i:3:p:273-284
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0165-4896(95)00797-0
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Warneryd, Karl, 1991. "Evolutionary stability in unanimity games with cheap talk," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 375-378, August.
    2. Bomze, I.M. & van Damme, E.E.C., 1990. "A dynamical characterization of evolutionarily stable states," Discussion Paper 1990-45, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    3. Selten, Reinhard, 1983. "Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 269-363, September.
    4. Bhaskar, V., 1994. "Noisy communication and the fast evolution of cooperation," Discussion Paper 1994-112, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    5. K. Binmore & L. Samuelson, 2010. "Evolutionary Stability in Repeated Games Played by Finite Automata," Levine's Working Paper Archive 561, David K. Levine.
    6. Bhaskar, V., 1994. "Noisy communication and the fast evolution of cooperation," Other publications TiSEM 3b3c313c-c748-4037-92a1-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    7. Binmore, Kenneth G. & Samuelson, Larry, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 278-305, August.
    8. Sobel, Joel, 1993. "Evolutionary stability and efficiency," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 42(2-3), pages 301-312.
    9. Selten, Reinhard, 1988. "Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games - correction and further development," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 223-266, December.
    10. Samuelson, Larry, 1991. "Limit evolutionarily stable strategies in two-player, normal form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 110-128, February.
    11. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1990. "Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 274-279, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Heller, Yuval, 2014. "Stability and trembles in extensive-form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 132-136.
    2. Bhaskar, V., 1998. "Noisy Communication and the Evolution of Cooperation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 110-131, September.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Bhaskar, V., 1995. "On te generic stability of mixed strategies in asymmetric contests," Other publications TiSEM 7805032a-e121-408b-8c26-a, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    2. Bhaskar, V., 1995. "On te generic stability of mixed strategies in asymmetric contests," Discussion Paper 1995-30, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    3. Jonathan Bendor & Piotr Swistak, 1998. "Evolutionary Equilibria: Characterization Theorems and Their Implications," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 45(2), pages 99-159, October.
    4. Weibull, Jörgen W., 1997. "What have we learned from Evolutionary Game Theory so far?," Working Paper Series 487, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 26 Oct 1998.
    5. Bhaskar, V., 1993. "Neutral Stability in Assymetric Evolutionary Games," Papers 9358, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
    6. Jörg Rieskamp & Peter Todd, 2006. "The Evolution of Cooperative Strategies for Asymmetric Social Interactions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 60(1), pages 69-111, February.
    7. Stefano Demichelis & Jorgen W. Weibull, 2008. "Language, Meaning, and Games: A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1292-1311, September.
    8. Bhaskar, V., 1993. "Neutral Stability in Asymmetric Evolutionary Games," Other publications TiSEM f34d4f5f-0377-41c0-b363-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    9. Weibull, Jörgen W., 1992. "An Introduction to Evolutionary Game Theory," Working Paper Series 347, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    10. Bhaskar, V., 1994. "Noisy communication and the fast evolution of cooperation," Discussion Paper 1994-112, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    11. Bhaskar, V., 1998. "Noisy Communication and the Evolution of Cooperation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 110-131, September.
    12. Anderlini, Luca & Sabourian, Hamid, 2001. "Cooperation and computability in n-player games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 99-137, September.
    13. García, Julián & van Veelen, Matthijs, 2016. "In and out of equilibrium I: Evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 161-189.
    14. Kolstad, Ivar, 2007. "The evolution of social norms: With managerial implications," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 58-72, February.
    15. Bhaskar, V., 1994. "Noisy communication and the fast evolution of cooperation," Other publications TiSEM 3b3c313c-c748-4037-92a1-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    16. Chong Lim Kim & Yong-Gwan Kim, 1993. "The Evolution of Obedience Norms in the Repeated Carrot-and-the Stick Game," Game Theory and Information 9311001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Norman, Thomas W.L., 2018. "Inefficient stage Nash is not stable," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 275-293.
    18. Aradhana Narang & A. J. Shaiju, 2019. "Evolutionary Stability of Polymorphic Profiles in Asymmetric Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 1126-1142, December.
    19. Werner Güth & Axel Ockenfels, 2002. "The Coevolution of Trust and Institutions in Anonymous and Non-anonymous Communities," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-07, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
    20. Shota Fujishima, 2015. "The emergence of cooperation through leadership," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(1), pages 17-36, February.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:30:y:1995:i:3:p:273-284. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.