IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hhs/iuiwop/0375.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Evolutionary Selection with Discriminating Players

Author

Listed:
  • Banerjee, Abhijit

    (Harvard University)

  • Weibull, Jörgen W.

    (Stockholm University)

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Banerjee, Abhijit & Weibull, Jörgen W., 1993. "Evolutionary Selection with Discriminating Players," Working Paper Series 375, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0375
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.ifn.se/wfiles/wp/wp375.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Warneryd, Karl, 1991. "Evolutionary stability in unanimity games with cheap talk," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 375-378, August.
    2. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1007-1028, July.
    3. Samuelson, Larry & Zhang, Jianbo, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 363-391, August.
    4. Swinkels, Jeroen M., 1992. "Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 306-332, August.
    5. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-1050, July.
    6. Friedman, Daniel, 1991. "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 637-666, May.
    7. A. J. Robson, 2010. "Efficiency in Evolutionary Games: Darwin, Nash and the Secret Handshake," Levine's Working Paper Archive 540, David K. Levine.
    8. Nachbar, J H, 1990. ""Evolutionary" Selection Dynamics in Games: Convergence and Limit Properties," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 19(1), pages 59-89.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Stefano Demichelis & Jorgen W. Weibull, 2008. "Language, Meaning, and Games: A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1292-1311, September.
    2. Ellison, Glenn, 1997. "Learning from Personal Experience: One Rational Guy and the Justification of Myopia," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 180-210, May.
    3. Amann, Erwin & Yang, Chun-Lei, 1998. "Sophistication and the persistence of cooperation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 91-105, September.
    4. Herold, Florian & Kuzmics, Christoph, 2009. "Evolutionary stability of discrimination under observability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 542-551, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Evolutionary game; Nash equilibrium; Discrimination;

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0375. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Elisabeth Gustafsson). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/iuiiise.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.