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Evolutionary dynamics and dominated strategies

Author

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  • Yannick Viossat

    (CEREMADE - CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Do evolutionary processes lead economic or biological agents to behave as if they were rational? To test this idea, many authors examined whether evolutionary game dynamics eliminate strictly dominated strategies.We survey, unify, and fill some gaps in this literature in the case of monotonic dynamics: a class of selection dynamics in which the growth rates of the pure strategies are ordered in accordance with their payoffs. We also survey results for other dynamics.

Suggested Citation

  • Yannick Viossat, 2015. "Evolutionary dynamics and dominated strategies," Post-Print hal-01253535, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01253535
    DOI: 10.1007/s40505-014-0062-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Viossat, Yannick, 2007. "The replicator dynamics does not lead to correlated equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 397-407, May.
    2. Hofbauer, Josef & Weibull, Jorgen W., 1996. "Evolutionary Selection against Dominated Strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 558-573, November.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Benjamin Wölfl & Hedy te Rietmole & Monica Salvioli & Artem Kaznatcheev & Frank Thuijsman & Joel S. Brown & Boudewijn Burgering & Kateřina Staňková, 2022. "The Contribution of Evolutionary Game Theory to Understanding and Treating Cancer," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 313-342, June.
    2. George Loginov, 2022. "Ordinal imitative dynamics," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 51(2), pages 391-412, June.
    3. Bernergård, Axel & Mohlin, Erik, 2019. "Evolutionary selection against iteratively weakly dominated strategies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 82-97.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    As-if rationality; Evolutionary games; Dominated strategies; Replicator dynamics; Monotonic dynamics; Innovative dynamics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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