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Communication, coordination and efficiency in evolutionary one-population models

  • Sjaak Hurkens
  • Karl H. Schlag

We analyze the role of commitment in pre-play communication for ensuring efficient evolutionarily stable outcomes in coordination games. All players are a priori identical as they are drawn from the same population. In games where efficient outcomes can be reached by players coordinating on the same action we find commitment to be necessary to enforce efficiency. In games where efficienct outcomes only result from play of different actions, communication without commitment is most effective although efficiency can no longer be guaranteed. Only when there are many messages then inefficient outcomes are negligible as their basins of attraction become very small.

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File URL: http://www.econ.upf.edu/docs/papers/downloads/387.pdf
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Paper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number 387.

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Date of creation: Apr 1999
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Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:387
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.econ.upf.edu/

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  1. K. Schlag, 2010. "Cheap Talk and Evolutionary Dynamics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 541, David K. Levine.
  2. Schlag, Karl H., 1996. "Which one should I imitate?," Discussion Paper Serie B 365, University of Bonn, Germany.
  3. Kim, Y.G. & Sobel, J., 1993. "An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication," Working Papers 93-02, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
  4. Karl H. Schlag & Dieter Balkenborg, 2001. "Evolutionarily stable sets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 571-595.
  5. Schlag, Karl H., 1994. "Why Imitate, and if so, How? Exploring a Model of Social Evolution," Discussion Paper Serie B 296, University of Bonn, Germany.
  6. Swinkels, J., 1991. "Evolutionary Stability with Equilibrium Entrants," Papers 9, Stanford - Institute for Thoretical Economics.
  7. Karl H. Schlag, 1995. "Why Imitate, and if so, How? A Bounded Rational Approach to Multi-Armed Bandits," Discussion Paper Serie B 361, University of Bonn, Germany, revised Mar 1996.
  8. Balkenborg, Dieter & Karl H. Schlag, 1996. "On the Interpretation of Evolutionary Stable Sets," Discussion Paper Serie B 313, University of Bonn, Germany.
  9. Aumann, Robert J. & Sorin, Sylvain, 1989. "Cooperation and bounded recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 5-39, March.
  10. Karl H. Schlag, . "When Does Evolution Lead to Efficiency in Communication Games?," ELSE working papers 026, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
  11. Matsui, Akihiko, 1992. "Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 343-362, August.
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