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Two-Speed Evolution with Pre-Play Communication and Limited Flexibility

Listed author(s):
  • Kenichi Amaya

    (Kobe University)

This paper studies the effects of pre-play communication on equilibrium selection in 2-by-2 symmetric coordination games. The players repeatedly play a coordination game preceded by an opportunity to exchange payoff irrelevant messages and gradually adjust their behavior. In short run, the players' access to the actions of the coordination game may be restricted. While the players can revise the set of accessible actions only occasionally, they frequently adjust their behavior in the cheap-talk game, taking the set of currently available actions as given. We obtain an efficient-equilibrium-selection result if the underlying coordination game satisfies the self-signaling condition. On the other hand, if the game is not self-signaling, both the efficient and the inefficient equilibrium outcomes are stable. (Copyright: Elsevier)

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File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2005.12.001
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Article provided by Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics in its journal Review of Economic Dynamics.

Volume (Year): 9 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 310-325

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Handle: RePEc:red:issued:v:9:y:2006:i:2:p:310-325
DOI: 10.1016/j.red.2005.12.001
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  1. Galesloot, Bob M. & Goyal, Sanjeev, 1997. "Costs of flexibility and equilibrium selection," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 249-264, October.
  2. Robson, A.J., 1989. "Efficiency In Evolutionary Games: Darwin, Nash And Secret Handshake," Papers 89-22, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
  3. Matsui, Akihiko, 1991. "Cheap-talk and cooperation in a society," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 245-258, August.
  4. Ely, Jeffrey C. & Yilankaya, Okan, 2001. "Nash Equilibrium and the Evolution of Preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 255-272, April.
  5. Blume, Andreas, 1998. "Communication, Risk, and Efficiency in Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 171-202, February.
  6. Goyal, Sanjeev & Janssen, Maarten C. W., 1997. "Non-Exclusive Conventions and Social Coordination," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 34-57, November.
  7. Baliga, Sandeep & Morris, Stephen, 2002. "Co-ordination, Spillovers, and Cheap Talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 450-468, August.
  8. Gilboa, Itzhak & Matsui, Akihiko, 1991. "Social Stability and Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 859-867, May.
  9. Swinkels, Jeroen M., 1992. "Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 306-332, August.
  10. Akihiko Matsui, 1989. "Cheap Talk and Cooperation in the Society," Discussion Papers 848, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  11. Kim, Yong-Gwan & Sobel, Joel, 1995. "An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-play Communication," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(5), pages 1181-1193, September.
  12. Matsui, Akihiko, 1992. "Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 343-362, August.
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