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Distorted Voronoi languages

Author

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  • Förster, Manuel

    (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

  • Riedel, Frank

    (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

Abstract

In a recent paper, Jäger, Metzger, and Riedel (2011) study communication games of common interest when signals are simple and types complex. They characterize strict Nash equilibria as so-called Voronoi languages that consist of Voronoi tesselations of the type set and Bayesian estimators on the side of receivers. In this note, we introduce conflicts of interest in the same setting. We characterize strict Nash equilibria as distorted Voronoi languages that use all messages. For large conflicts, such informative equilibria need not exist. If the bias is sufficiently small, however, these equilibria do exist. This establishes the robustness of the results in Jäger, Metzger, and Riedel (2011) to biased interests. We finally give examples of strict Nash equilibria, one of them using simulations to illustrate an equilibrium with many messages and non-uniformly distributed types.

Suggested Citation

  • Förster, Manuel & Riedel, Frank, 2016. "Distorted Voronoi languages," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 458, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
  • Handle: RePEc:bie:wpaper:458
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    File URL: https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/download/2900982/2900985
    File Function: First Version, 2011
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ariel Rubinstein, 2000. "Economics and Language," Online economics textbooks, SUNY-Oswego, Department of Economics, number lang1, March.
    2. Robson, A.J., 1989. "Efficiency In Evolutionary Games: Darwin, Nash And Secret Handshake," Papers 89-22, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
    3. Efe A. Ok, 2007. "Preliminaries of Real Analysis, from Real Analysis with Economic Applications," Introductory Chapters,in: Real Analysis with Economic Applications Princeton University Press.
    4. Warneryd Karl, 1993. "Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Evolutionary Stability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 532-546, October.
    5. Schlag,Karl, "undated". "Cheap talk and evolutionary dynamics," Discussion Paper Serie B 242, University of Bonn, Germany.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cheap Talk; Signaling Game; Communication Game; Voronoi tesselation; Conflict of Interest;

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