The evolution of type communication in a sender/receiver game of common interest with cheap talk
No abstract is available for this item.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Joseph Farrell and Robert Gibbons., 1988.
"Cheap Talk Can Matter in Bargaining,"
Economics Working Papers
8863, University of California at Berkeley.
- Robert Gibbons & Joseph Farrell, 1988. "Cheap Talk Can Matter in Bargaining," Working papers 482, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Farrell, Joseph & Gibbons, Robert, 1988. "Cheap Talk Can Matter in Bargaining," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt3qz786xq, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Blume Andreas & Kim Yong-Gwan & Sobel Joel, 1993.
"Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 547-575, October.
- Blume, A. & Kim, Y.G. & Sobel, J., 1992. "Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication," Working Papers 92-17, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
- Blume, A. & Kim, Y.G. & Sobel, J., 1993. "Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication," Working Papers 93-07, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
- A. Blume & Y. G. Kim & J. Sobel, 2010. "Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication," Levine's Working Paper Archive 530, David K. Levine.
- Aumann, Robert J. & Sorin, Sylvain, 1989. "Cooperation and bounded recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 5-39, March.
- Warneryd Karl, 1993. "Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Evolutionary Stability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 532-546, October.
- Andreoni James & Miller John H., 1995. "Auctions with Artificial Adaptive Agents," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 39-64, July.
- Arifovic, Jasmina, 1996. "The Behavior of the Exchange Rate in the Genetic Algorithm and Experimental Economies," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(3), pages 510-41, June.
- Arifovic, Jasmina & Eaton, Curtis, 1995.
"Coordination via Genetic Learning,"
Society for Computational Economics, vol. 8(3), pages 181-203, August.
- Tesfatsion, Leigh, 1997.
"A Trade Network Game with Endogenous Partner Selection,"
Staff General Research Papers
1680, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Leigh TESFATSION, 1995. "A Trade Network Game With Endogenous Partner Selection," Economic Report 36, Iowa State University Department of Economics.
- Matsui, Akihiko, 1991. "Cheap-talk and cooperation in a society," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 245-258, August.
- Miller, John H., 1996. "The coevolution of automata in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 87-112, January.
- Arifovic, Jasmina, 1994. "Genetic algorithm learning and the cobweb model," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 3-28, January.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:22:y:1998:i:8-9:p:1187-1207. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.