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How Economists Can Get Alife

  • Leigh TESFATSION

    ()

This paper presents a summary overview of the fast-developing field of "artificial life," stressing aspects that seem especially relevant for the study of decentralized market economies. In particular, recent artificial life work combining evolutionary game theory with preferential partner selection is described in some detail. This work is currently being applied to the endogenous formation and evolution of trade networks.

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File URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18196
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Paper provided by Iowa State University Department of Economics in its series Economic Report with number 37.

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Date of creation: Sep 1995
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:isu:iowaer:37
Contact details of provider: Postal: Iowa State University, Dept. of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070
Phone: +1 515.294.6741
Fax: +1 515.294.0221
Web page: http://www.econ.iastate.edu
Email:


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  1. Alan P. Kirman, 1995. "Economies with Interacting Agents," Discussion Paper Serie A 500, University of Bonn, Germany.
  2. Richard R. Nelson, 1995. "Recent Evolutionary Theorizing about Economic Change," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 33(1), pages 48-90, March.
  3. Dan Ashlock & Mark D. Smucker & E. Ann Stanley & Leigh Tesfatsion, 1995. "Preferential Partner Selection in an Evolutionary Study of Prisoner's Dilemma," Game Theory and Information 9501002, EconWPA, revised 20 Jan 1995.
  4. Esther Hauk, . "Leaving the Prison: A Discussion of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma under Preferential Partner Selection," Computing in Economics and Finance 1996 _067, Society for Computational Economics.
  5. Bosch, A. & Sunder, S., 1994. "Tracking the Invisible Hand: Convergence of Double Auctions to Competitive Equilibrium," GSIA Working Papers 1994-11, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
  6. Brock,W.A. & Durlauf,S.N., 2000. "Discrete choice with social interactions," Working papers 7, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  7. Birchenhall, Chris, 1995. "Modular Technical Change and Genetic Algorithms," Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, vol. 8(3), pages 233-53, August.
  8. Ulrich Witt, 2006. "Evolutionary Economics," Papers on Economics and Evolution 2006-05, Philipps University Marburg, Department of Geography.
  9. Kirman, Alan, 1993. "Ants, Rationality, and Recruitment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(1), pages 137-56, February.
  10. Friedman, Daniel, 1991. "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 637-66, May.
  11. McFadzean, David & Tesfatsion, Leigh, 1999. "A C++ Platform for the Evolution of Trade Networks," Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, vol. 14(1-2), pages 109-34, October.
  12. Tesfatsion, Leigh, 1997. "A Trade Network Game with Endogenous Partner Selection," Staff General Research Papers 1680, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  13. Marks, R E, 1992. "Breeding Hybrid Strategies: Optimal Behaviour for Oligopolists," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 17-38, March.
  14. Holland, John H & Miller, John H, 1991. "Artificial Adaptive Agents in Economic Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 365-71, May.
  15. Sergei Guriev & Igor Pospelov & Margarita Shakhova, . "Self-Organization of Trade Networks in an Economy with Imperfect Infrastructure," Computing in Economics and Finance 1996 _022, Society for Computational Economics.
  16. Yannis M. Ioannides, 1996. "Evolution of Trading Structures," Working Papers 96-04-020, Santa Fe Institute.
  17. repec:att:wimass:9426 is not listed on IDEAS
  18. George Mailath & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked, 1994. "Evolution and Endogenous Interactions," Game Theory and Information 9410003, EconWPA.
  19. James Bullard & John Duffy, 1994. "A model of learning and emulation with artificial adaptive agents," Working Papers 1994-014, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
  20. Tesfatsion, Leigh, 1995. "How to Get Alife," Staff General Research Papers 10546, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  21. Arthur, W Brian, 1993. "On Designing Economic Agents That Behave Like Human Agents," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 1-22, February.
  22. Hirshlifer, David & Rassmusen, Eric, 1989. "Cooperation in a repeated prisoners' dilemma with ostracism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 87-106, August.
  23. Miller, John H., 1996. "The coevolution of automata in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 87-112, January.
  24. Marimon, Ramon & McGrattan, Ellen & Sargent, Thomas J., 1990. "Money as a medium of exchange in an economy with artificially intelligent agents," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 329-373, May.
  25. Arifovic, Jasmina, 1994. "Genetic algorithm learning and the cobweb model," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 3-28, January.
  26. Joshua M. Epstein & Robert L. Axtell, 1996. "Growing Artificial Societies: Social Science from the Bottom Up," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262550253, June.
  27. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
  28. Stanley, E.A. & Ashlock, Daniel & Tesfatsion, Leigh, 1994. "Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Choice and Refusal of Partners," Staff General Research Papers 11180, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
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