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Evolution and Endogenous Interactions

Author

Listed:
  • George Mailath

    (University of Pennsylvania)

  • Larry Samuelson

    (University of Wisconsin)

  • Avner Shaked

    (University of Bonn)

Abstract

We examine an evolutionary model with "local interactions," so that some agents may be more likely to interact than others. We show that equilibrium strategy choices with given local interactions correspond to correlated equilibria of the underlying game, suggesting an new interpretation for correlated equilibrium. We then allow the pattern of interactions itself to be shaped by evolutionary pressures. If agents do not have the ability to avoid unwanted interactions, the heterogeneous outcomes can appear, including outcomes in which different groups play different Pareto ranked equilibria. If agents do have the ability to avoid undesired interaction, then we derive conditions under which outcomes must be not only homogeneous but efficient.

Suggested Citation

  • George Mailath & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked, 1994. "Evolution and Endogenous Interactions," Game Theory and Information 9410003, EconWPA.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9410003
    Note: Three tex files; use georgbi.bib and larrybib.bib in george.tex
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    Cited by:

    1. Giorgio Fagiolo & Luigi Marengo & Marco Valente, 2004. "Endogenous Networks In Random Population Games," Mathematical Population Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(2), pages 121-147.
    2. Tesfatsion, Leigh S., 1998. "Gale-Shapley Matching in an Evolutionary Trade Network Game," Staff General Research Papers Archive 1230, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    3. Fernando Vega Redondo, 1997. "Unfolding social hierarchies in large population games," Working Papers. Serie AD 1997-23, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    4. Peyton Young, H., 1998. "Individual learning and social rationality1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 651-663, May.
    5. Leigh S. Tesfatsion, "undated". "An Evolutionary Trade Network Game with Preferential Partner Selection," Computing in Economics and Finance 1996 _057, Society for Computational Economics.
    6. Avner Shaked & Larry Samuelson & George J. Mailath, 1997. "Correlated equilibria and local interactions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 9(3), pages 551-556.
    7. Leigh TESFATSION, 1995. "How Economists Can Get Alife," Economic Report 37, Iowa State University Department of Economics.
    8. Stephen Morris, 2000. "Contagion," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(1), pages 57-78.
    9. Esther Hauk, "undated". "Leaving the Prison: A Discussion of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma under Preferential Partner Selection," Computing in Economics and Finance 1996 _067, Society for Computational Economics.
    10. Tesfatsion, Leigh S., 1998. "Teaching Agent-Based Computational Economics to Graduate Students," Staff General Research Papers Archive 1199, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    11. Sanjeev Goyal & Fernando Vega-Redondo, 2000. "Learning, Network Formation and Coordination," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0113, Econometric Society.
    12. Edward L. Glaeser & Jose Scheinkman, 2000. "Non-Market Interactions," NBER Working Papers 8053, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Giorgio Fagiolo, 2001. "Coordination, Local Interactions and Endogenous Neighborhood Formation," LEM Papers Series 2001/15, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.
    14. Goyal, Sanjeev & Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 2005. "Network formation and social coordination," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 178-207, February.
    15. Leigh TESFATSION, 1995. "A Trade Network Game With Endogenous Partner Selection," Economic Report 36, Iowa State University Department of Economics.
    16. Illan Eshel & Emilia Sansone & Avner Shaked, 1996. "Evolutionar Dnamics of Populations wirth a Local Interaction Structure," Discussion Paper Serie B 350, University of Bonn, Germany.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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