Endogenous Networks In Random Population Games
Population learning in dynamic economies traditionally has been studied in contexts where payoff landscapes are smooth. Here, dynamic population games take place over “rugged” landscapes, where agents are uncertain about payoffs from bilateral interactions. Notably, individual payoffs from playing a binary action against everyone else are uniformly distributed over [0, 1]. This random population game leads the population to adapt over time, with agents updating both actions and partners. Agents evaluate payoffs associated to networks thanks to simple statistics of the distributions of payoffs associated to all combinations of actions performed by agents out of the interaction set. Simulations show that: (1) allowing for endogenous networks implies higher average payoff compared to static networks; (2) the statistics used to evaluate payoffs affect convergence to steady-state; and (3) for statistics MIN or MAX, the likelihood of efficient population learning strongly depends on whether agents are change-averse or not in discriminating between options delivering the same expected payoff.
Volume (Year): 11 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.tandfonline.com/GMPS20|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/GMPS20|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Blume,L.E. & Durlauf,S.N., 2000. "The interactions-based approach to socioeconomic behavior," Working papers 1, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Bhaskar, V & Vega-Redondo, F, 1996.
"Migration and the Evolution of Conventions,"
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
354.96, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Giorgio Fagiolo, 2001.
"Coordination, Local Interactions and Endogenous Neighborhood Formation,"
LEM Papers Series
2001/15, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.
- Giorgio Fagiolo, 2002. "Coordination, Local Interactions, and Endogenous Neighborhood Formation," Computing in Economics and Finance 2002 98, Society for Computational Economics.
- Jackson, Matthew O., 1998.
"The Evolution of Social and Economic Networks,"
1044, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993.
"Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games,"
Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
- M. Kandori & G. Mailath & R. Rob, 1999. "Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 500, David K. Levine.
- Kandori, M. & Mailath, G.J., 1991. "Learning, Mutation, And Long Run Equilibria In Games," Papers 71, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - John M. Olin Program.
- Blume Lawrence E., 1993.
"The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 387-424, July.
- L. Blume, 2010. "The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 488, David K. Levine.
- Alexander F. Tieman & Harold Houba & Gerard van der Laan, 1998. "Cooperation in a Multi-Dimensional Local Interaction Model," Game Theory and Information 9803002, EconWPA.
- Ellison, Glenn, 1993.
"Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination,"
Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1047-71, September.
- Brock, William A & Durlauf, Steven N, 2001.
"Discrete Choice with Social Interactions,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(2), pages 235-60, April.
- Nobuyuki Hanaki & Alexander Peterhansl, 2002. "Viability of Cooperation in Evolving Interaction Structures," Computing in Economics and Finance 2002 120, Society for Computational Economics.
- Ashlock, Daniel & Smucker, Mark D. & Stanley, E. Ann & Tesfatsion, Leigh S., 1996.
"Preferential Partner Selection in an Evolutionary Study of Prisoner's Dilemma,"
Staff General Research Papers
1687, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Dan Ashlock & Mark D. Smucker & E. Ann Stanley & Leigh Tesfatsion, 1995. "Preferential Partner Selection in an Evolutionary Study of Prisoner's Dilemma," Game Theory and Information 9501002, EconWPA, revised 20 Jan 1995.
- George Mailath & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked, 1994.
"Evolution and Endogenous Interactions,"
Game Theory and Information
- Page, Scott E, 1997. "On Incentives and Updating in Agent Based Models," Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, vol. 10(1), pages 67-87, February.
- Dieckmann, Tone, 1999. "The evolution of conventions with mobile players," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 93-111, January.
- Goyal, Sanjeev & Janssen, Maarten C. W., 1997. "Non-Exclusive Conventions and Social Coordination," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 34-57, November.
- Joerg Oechssler, 1994.
"Decentralization and the Coordination Problem,"
Game Theory and Information
- Hirshlifer, David & Rassmusen, Eric, 1989. "Cooperation in a repeated prisoners' dilemma with ostracism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 87-106, August.
- Stanley, E.A. & Ashlock, Daniel & Tesfatsion, Leigh, 1994. "Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Choice and Refusal of Partners," Staff General Research Papers 11180, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Edward Droste & Robert P. Gilles & Cathleen Johnson, 2000. "Evolution of Conventions in Endogenous Social Networks," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0594, Econometric Society.
- Watts, Alison, 2001. "A Dynamic Model of Network Formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 331-341, February.
- Alan Kirman, 1997. "The economy as an evolving network," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 7(4), pages 339-353.
- H. Peyton Young, 1996. "The Economics of Convention," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(2), pages 105-122, Spring.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:mpopst:v:11:y:2004:i:2:p:121-147. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Michael McNulty)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.