Preferential Partner Selection in an Evolutionary Study of Prisoner's Dilemma
This study reports on extensive computer experiments for the "Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Choice and Refusal of Partners (IPD/CR)" framework. For example, it is shown that the introduction of choice and refusal tends to enhance the emergence of cooperation in IPD games in comparison to either random or round-robin partner selection. In addition, with choice and refusal of partners, the fitness values of the players tend to cluster fairly tightly into a small number of narrow regions. Within any one fitness region, however, the players consist of genetically diverse players with interaction patterns peculiarly adapted to the choice and refusal mechanism. Detailed sensitivity studies are also reported with respect to key parameters such as the learning algorithm "memory weight," the "minimum tolerance level" below which game offers are refused, and the "refusal payoff" incurred by a player whenever one of his game offers is refused. Annotated pointers to related work can be accessed here: http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/tnghome.htm
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|Date of creation:||01 Jan 1996|
|Publication status:||Published in BioSystems 1996, vol. 37, pp. 99-125|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Iowa State University, Dept. of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070|
Phone: +1 515.294.6741
Fax: +1 515.294.0221
Web page: http://www.econ.iastate.edu
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Hirshlifer, David & Rassmusen, Eric, 1989. "Cooperation in a repeated prisoners' dilemma with ostracism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 87-106, August.
- Stanley, E.A. & Ashlock, Daniel & Tesfatsion, Leigh, 1994. "Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Choice and Refusal of Partners," Staff General Research Papers Archive 11180, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Gordon Tullock, 1985. "Adam Smith and the Prisoners' Dilemma," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(Supplemen), pages 1073-1081.
- Marimon, Ramon & McGrattan, Ellen & Sargent, Thomas J., 1990. "Money as a medium of exchange in an economy with artificially intelligent agents," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 329-373, May.
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