IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/isu/genres/1687.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Preferential Partner Selection in an Evolutionary Study of Prisoner's Dilemma

Author

Listed:
  • Ashlock, Daniel
  • Smucker, Mark D.
  • Stanley, E. Ann
  • Tesfatsion, Leigh S.

Abstract

This study reports on extensive computer experiments for the "Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Choice and Refusal of Partners (IPD/CR)" framework. For example, it is shown that the introduction of choice and refusal tends to enhance the emergence of cooperation in IPD games in comparison to either random or round-robin partner selection. In addition, with choice and refusal of partners, the fitness values of the players tend to cluster fairly tightly into a small number of narrow regions. Within any one fitness region, however, the players consist of genetically diverse players with interaction patterns peculiarly adapted to the choice and refusal mechanism. Detailed sensitivity studies are also reported with respect to key parameters such as the learning algorithm "memory weight," the "minimum tolerance level" below which game offers are refused, and the "refusal payoff" incurred by a player whenever one of his game offers is refused. Annotated pointers to related work can be accessed here: http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/tnghome.htm

Suggested Citation

  • Ashlock, Daniel & Smucker, Mark D. & Stanley, E. Ann & Tesfatsion, Leigh S., 1996. "Preferential Partner Selection in an Evolutionary Study of Prisoner's Dilemma," Staff General Research Papers Archive 1687, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:isu:genres:1687
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hirshlifer, David & Rassmusen, Eric, 1989. "Cooperation in a repeated prisoners' dilemma with ostracism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 87-106, August.
    2. Stanley, E. Ann & Ashlock, Dan & Tesfatsion, Leigh, 1993. "Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Choice and Refusal of Partners," ISU General Staff Papers 199302010800001028, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    3. Gordon Tullock, 1985. "Adam Smith and the Prisoners' Dilemma," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(Supplemen), pages 1073-1081.
    4. Marimon, Ramon & McGrattan, Ellen & Sargent, Thomas J., 1990. "Money as a medium of exchange in an economy with artificially intelligent agents," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 329-373, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Leigh TESFATSION, 1995. "How Economists Can Get Alife," Economic Report 37, Iowa State University Department of Economics.
    2. Leigh S. Tesfatsion, "undated". "An Evolutionary Trade Network Game with Preferential Partner Selection," Computing in Economics and Finance 1996 _057, Society for Computational Economics.
    3. Tesfatsion, Leigh, 1995. "A Trade Network Game with Endogenous Partner Selection," ISU General Staff Papers 199505010700001034, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    4. Tesfatsion, Leigh, 1998. "Teaching Agent-Based Computational Economics to Graduate Students," ISU General Staff Papers 199807010700001043, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    5. Esther Hauk, "undated". "Leaving the Prison: A Discussion of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma under Preferential Partner Selection," Computing in Economics and Finance 1996 _067, Society for Computational Economics.
    6. Tesfatsion, Leigh, 1998. "Gale-Shapley Matching in an Evolutionary Trade Network Game," ISU General Staff Papers 199804010800001041, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    7. Vriend, Nicolaas J., 2000. "An illustration of the essential difference between individual and social learning, and its consequences for computational analyses," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 1-19, January.
    8. Giorgio Fagiolo & Luigi Marengo & Marco Valente, 2004. "Endogenous Networks In Random Population Games," Mathematical Population Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(2), pages 121-147.
    9. Janssen, Marco A., 2008. "Evolution of cooperation in a one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma based on recognition of trustworthy and untrustworthy agents," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(3-4), pages 458-471, March.
    10. Ronald S. Burt, 1999. "Private Games are too Dangerous," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 311-341, December.
    11. Fogel, Kathy & Jandik, Tomas & McCumber, William R., 2018. "CFO social capital and private debt," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 28-52.
    12. Ehrentreich, Norman, 2006. "Technical trading in the Santa Fe Institute Artificial Stock Market revisited," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(4), pages 599-616, December.
    13. Bramoullé, Yann & Goyal, Sanjeev, 2016. "Favoritism," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 16-27.
    14. Kollman, Ken & Miller, John H. & Page, Scott E., 1997. "Landscape formation in a spatial voting model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 121-130, August.
    15. Michel Zouboulakis, 2010. "Trustworthiness as a Moral Determinant of Economic Activity: Lessons from the Classics," Forum for Social Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 39(3), pages 209-221, January.
    16. Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro & Lagos, Ricardo & Wright, Randall, 2016. "Introduction to the symposium issue on money and liquidity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 164(C), pages 1-9.
    17. Maurizio Iacopetta, 2014. "Dynamics of assets liquidity and inequality in economies with decentralized markets," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/2029nqlehl8, Sciences Po.
    18. Benson Bruce L., 2000. "Jurisdictional Choice in International Trade: Implications for Lex Cybernatoria," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-30, March.
    19. E. Samanidou & E. Zschischang & D. Stauffer & T. Lux, 2001. "Microscopic Models of Financial Markets," Papers cond-mat/0110354, arXiv.org.
    20. van Damme, E.E.C., 1995. "Game theory : The next stage," Discussion Paper 1995-73, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:isu:genres:1687. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: . General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/deiasus.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Curtis Balmer (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/deiasus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.