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Jurisdictional Choice in International Trade: Implications for Lex Cybernatoria

Listed author(s):
  • Benson Bruce L.

    (Florida State University)

Lémergence des marchés en Europe de lEst, en Asie et celle du cyber-espace ne se fait pas avec la rapidité que beaucoup dobservateurs voudraient. La lenteur de ce développement provient de lenvironnement institutionnel : les systèmes législatifs ne soutiennent pas les droits de propriété privée et ne font pas plus respecter les contrats. Ainsi, beaucoup soutiennent que les Etats doivent intensifier leurs efforts pour établir un droit commercial. En réalité, il faut réclamer un désengagement de lEtat dans le droit commercial. Tout au long de lhistoire, le recours efficace de lactivité commerciale est toujours provenu dun système polycentrique de droit coutumier avec des querelles résolues par le biais de cours de commerce ou darbitrage eux-mêmes appuyés par des sanctions dostracisme imposées de façon privée, et il en est de même pour le droit commercial international aujourdhui. Nous proposons une description des institutions et des processus du droit commercial international, suivie de discutions sur la nécessité dun droit polycentrique et des caractéristiques du droit coutumier. Finalement, nous expliquons pourquoi nous devrions compter sur un système de droit coutumier polycentrique sans Etat pour lémergence récente des marchés.The emergence of markets in Eastern Europe, Asia, and cyberspace is no occurring as rapidly as many observers would like. Slow development is a function of the institutional environment: legal systems do not support private property rights or enforce contracts. Thus, many contend that states must step up their efforts to establish commercial law. In reality, less state involvement in commercial law is called for. Throughout history effective recourse for commercial activity has been produced through a polycentric system of customary law with disputes resolved through merchant courts or arbitration backed by privately imposed ostracism sanctions, and the same is true for international commercial law today. A description of the institutions and processes of international commercial law is provided, followed by discussions of the desirability of polycentric law and the characteristics of customary law. Finally, an explanation is provided for why a stateless system of polycentric customary law should be relied upon in modern emerging markets.

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Article provided by De Gruyter in its journal Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines.

Volume (Year): 10 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 1-32

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Handle: RePEc:bpj:jeehcn:v:10:y:2000:i:1:n:1
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  1. Williamson, Oliver E, 1991. "Economic Institutions: Spontaneous and Intentional Governance," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 159-187, Special I.
  2. Bruce L. Benson, 1999. "Polycentric Law Versus Monopolized Law : Implications from International Trade for the Potential Success of Emerging Markets," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 15(Fall 1999), pages 36-66.
  3. Benson, Bruce L, 1999. "An Economic Theory of the Evolution of Governance and the Emergence of the State," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 12(2), pages 131-160, November.
  4. P Kanaroglou & K-L Liaw & Y Y Papageorgiou, 1986. "An Analysis of Migratory Systems: 1. Theory," Environment and Planning A, , vol. 18(7), pages 913-928, July.
  5. Bruce Benson, 1992. "Customary law as a social contract: International commercial law," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 1-27, December.
  6. Bruce Benson, 1999. "To Arbitrate or To Litigate: That Is the Question," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 91-151, September.
  7. Nelson, Philip, 1974. "Advertising as Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(4), pages 729-754, July/Aug..
  8. Benson, Bruce L, 1995. "An Exploration of the Impact of Modern Arbitration Statutes on the Development of Arbitration in the United States," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(2), pages 479-501, October.
  9. Gordon Tullock, 1985. "Adam Smith and the Prisoners' Dilemma," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(Supplemen), pages 1073-1081.
  10. Bloom, David E & Cavanagh, Christopher L, 1986. "An Analysis of the Selection of Arbitrators," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 408-422, June.
  11. Shavell, Steven, 1995. "Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(1), pages 1-28, January.
  12. Bernstein, Lisa, 1992. "Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(1), pages 115-157, January.
  13. Cooter, Robert D., 1994. "Structural adjudication and the new law merchant: A model of decentralized law," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 215-231, June.
  14. Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-641, August.
  15. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
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