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Market Institutions and Judicial Rulemaking

In: Handbook of New Institutional Economics

Author

Listed:
  • Benito Arruñada

    (Universitat Pompeu Fabra Barcelona)

  • Veneta Andonova

    (Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México)

Abstract

The proper functioning of a market economy requires that freedom of contract be protected effectively. This can be achieved in different ways. A major design decision concerns the rulemaking discretion that the legislator delegates to the courts. When taking this decision, the legislator should take into account the specialization advantages and transaction costs that come with more or less specialized rulemaking. Factors influencing this trade-off explain the different solutions adopted in the two main legal traditions of the West. Common law evolved keeping more rulemaking powers in the judiciary, and thus was characterized by unspecialized rulemaking. The civil law tradition, however, was transformed during the 19th century, reserving greater rulemaking power for the legislative branch and thus reducing the discretion that judges had enjoyed during the Ancient Regime.

Suggested Citation

  • Benito Arruñada & Veneta Andonova, 2008. "Market Institutions and Judicial Rulemaking," Springer Books, in: Claude Ménard & Mary M. Shirley (ed.), Handbook of New Institutional Economics, chapter 10, pages 229-250, Springer.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-69305-5_11
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-69305-5_11
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    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Crettez, Bertrand & Deffains, Bruno & Musy, Olivier & Tallec, Ronan, 2020. "State Capacity, Legal Design and the Venality of Judicial Offices," MPRA Paper 105009, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Crettez, Bertrand & Deffains, Bruno & Musy, Olivier, 2016. "French legal origins: A Tocquevilian view," MPRA Paper 72582, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Arruñada Benito & Andonova Veneta, 2008. "Judges' Cognition and Market Order," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(2), pages 665-692, December.
    5. Galang, Roberto Martin N., 2014. "Divergent diffusion: Understanding the interaction between institutions, firms, networks and knowledge in the international adoption of technology," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 512-521.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
    • N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative
    • O10 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General

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