IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Arbitration in International Trade


  • Alessandra Casella.


The great majority of international contracts provides that any disputes which may arise will be decided by arbitration. Legal scholars argue that international arbitration is leading to the development of legal doctrine attuned to the needs of business and independent of national laws. This paper studies international arbitration as a beautiful example of the role of private trade in shaping international institutions. We review the provisions and the practice of international arbitration, and present a general equilibrium model of the relationship between the expansion of trade and the adoption of arbitration. The model focuses on the heterogeneity existing among economic agents in terms of their legal needs. It shows how arbitration alters the size and composition of markets, while at the same time responding to exogenous change in trade. In addition, it shows how the legal services provided by the courts deteriorate in the presence of arbitration and predicts that the share of traders using arbitration should rise as markets expand. Overall, the model does remarkably well in generating results commonly discussed in the legal literature.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Alessandra Casella., 1992. "Arbitration in International Trade," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C92-003, University of California at Berkeley.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucb:calbcd:c92-003

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    File Function: main text
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Paul R. Milgrom & Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, 1990. "The Role Of Institutions In The Revival Of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, And The Champagne Fairs," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(1), pages 1-23, March.
    2. Alessandra Casella & Jonathan S. Feinstein, 1990. "Public Goods in Trade: On the Formation of Markets and Political Jurisdictions," NBER Working Papers 3554, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Casella, Alessandra, 1992. "On Markets and Clubs: Economic and Political Integration of Regions with Unequal Productivity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(2), pages 115-121, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Alessandro Turrini & Tanguy Van Ypersele, 2001. "Traders, Courts and the Home Bias Puzzle," Development Working Papers 159, Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano, University of Milano.
    2. Bruno S. Frey, 2005. "Zwei Utopien jenseits des Weltstaates und der Anarchie," CREMA Working Paper Series 2005-32, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    3. Casella, Alessandra, 1993. "Trade as Engine of Political Change: A Parable," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers 233188, University of California-Berkeley, Department of Economics.
    4. Turrini, Alessandro Antonio & van Ypersele, Tanguy, 2006. "Legal Costs as Barriers to Trade," CEPR Discussion Papers 5751, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Bruce Benson, 1999. "To Arbitrate or To Litigate: That Is the Question," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 91-151, September.
    6. Turrini, Alessandro & van Ypersele, Tanguy, 2010. "Traders, courts, and the border effect puzzle," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(2-3), pages 81-91, May.
    7. Volckart, Oliver, 2004. "The economics of feuding in late medieval Germany," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 282-299, July.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucb:calbcd:c92-003. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.