IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/721.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Arbitration in International Trade

Author

Listed:
  • Casella, Alessandra

Abstract

The great majority of international contracts provide for arbitration in the event of dispute. Legal scholars argue that international arbitration is causing the development of a legal doctrine attuned to the needs of business and independent of national laws. This paper studies international arbitration as a prime example of private trade shaping international institutions. The provisions and the practice of international arbitration are reviewed, and a general equilibrium model of the relationship between the expansion of international trade and the adoption of arbitration is presented. The model focuses on the heterogeneity of economic agents in terms of their legal needs. It shows how arbitration alters the size and composition of markets, while at the same time responding to exogenous changes in trade. In addition, it shows how the legal services provided by the courts deteriorate in the presence of arbitration, predicting that the share of traders using arbitration should rise as markets expand. Overall, the model does remarkably well in generating results commonly discussed in the legal literature.

Suggested Citation

  • Casella, Alessandra, 1992. "Arbitration in International Trade," CEPR Discussion Papers 721, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:721
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=721
    Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Paul R. Milgrom & Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast*, 1990. "The Role Of Institutions In The Revival Of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, And The Champagne Fairs," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(1), pages 1-23, March.
    2. Alessandra Casella & Jonathan S. Feinstein, 1990. "Public Goods in Trade: On the Formation of Markets and Political Jurisdictions," NBER Working Papers 3554, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Barry Eichengreen., 1992. "The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy After EMU," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C92-004, University of California at Berkeley.
    4. Jeff Frankel, Steve Phillips, and Menzie Chinn., 1992. "Financial and Currency Integration in the European Monetary System: The Statistical Record," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C92-005, University of California at Berkeley.
    5. Casella, Alessandra, 1992. "On Markets and Clubs: Economic and Political Integration of Regions with Unequal Productivity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(2), pages 115-121, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Casella, Alessandra, 1993. "Trade as an Engine of Political Change. A Parable," CEPR Discussion Papers 779, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2002. "Political economics and public finance," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 24, pages 1549-1659, Elsevier.
    3. Eichengreen, Barry, 1993. "A Marshall Plan for the East: Options for 1993," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers 233185, University of California-Berkeley, Department of Economics.
    4. Jeffrey A. Frankel., 1992. "The Evolving Japanese Financial System, and the Cost of Capital," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C92-002, University of California at Berkeley.
    5. Michel Le Breton & Shlomo Weber, 2003. "The Art of Making Everybody Happy: How to Prevent a Secession," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 50(3), pages 1-4.
    6. Maurice Obstfeld, 1993. "International Capital Mobility in the 1990s," NBER Working Papers 4534, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Jeffrey A. Frankel, 1993. "Monetary regime choices for a semi-open country," Pacific Basin Working Paper Series 93-02, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    8. Mr. Ehtisham Ahmad & Mr. Raju J Singh, 2003. "Political Economy of Oil-Revenue Sharing in a Developing Country: Illustrations from Nigeria," IMF Working Papers 2003/016, International Monetary Fund.
    9. Menzie Chinn & Jeffrey Frankel, 1991. "Patterns in Exchange Rate Forecasts for 25 Currencies," NBER Working Papers 3807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Pranab Bardhan, 1998. "The Contributions of Endogenous Growth Theory to the Analysis of Development Problems: An Assessment," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Fabrizio Coricelli & Massimo di Matteo & Frank Hahn (ed.), New Theories in Growth and Development, chapter 5, pages 97-110, Palgrave Macmillan.
    11. Jeffrey A. Frankel and Norbert Funke., 1994. "A Two-Country Analysis of International Targeting of Nominal GNP," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C94-035, University of California at Berkeley.
    12. Pranab Bardhan., 1993. "Rational Fools and Cooperation in a Poor Hydraulic Economy," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C93-015, University of California at Berkeley.
    13. Stein, Ernesto H. & Streb, Jorge M., 1998. "Political stabilization cycles in high-inflation economies," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 159-180, June.
    14. Bayoumi, Tamim & Eichengreen, Barry, 1994. "Macroeconomic Adjustment under Bretton Woods and the Post-Bretton-Woods Float: An Impulse-Response Analysis," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 104(425), pages 813-827, July.
    15. Barry Eichengreen., 1994. "History and Reform of the International Monetary System," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C94-041, University of California at Berkeley.
    16. Bolton, Patrick & Roland, Gerard & Spolaore, Enrico, 1996. "Economic theories of the break-up and integration of nations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 697-705, April.
    17. Alberto Alesina & Enrico Spolaore, 1997. "On the Number and Size of Nations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(4), pages 1027-1056.
    18. Mr. Michel Le Breton & Mr. Shlomo Weber, 2001. "The Art of Making Everybody Happy: How to Prevent a Secession," IMF Working Papers 2001/176, International Monetary Fund.
    19. Dominguez, Kathryn M. & Frankel, Jeffrey A., 1992. "Does Foreign Exchange Intervention Matter? Disentangling the Portfolio and Expectations Effects," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers 233167, University of California-Berkeley, Department of Economics.
    20. Alesina, Alberto & Perotti, Roberto & Spolaore, Enrico, 1995. "Togetheror separately? Issues on the costs and benefits of political and fiscal unions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(3-4), pages 751-758, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Arbitration; Institutions; International Integration;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:721. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cepr.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.