IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/721.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Arbitration in International Trade

Author

Listed:
  • Casella, Alessandra

Abstract

The great majority of international contracts provide for arbitration in the event of dispute. Legal scholars argue that international arbitration is causing the development of a legal doctrine attuned to the needs of business and independent of national laws. This paper studies international arbitration as a prime example of private trade shaping international institutions. The provisions and the practice of international arbitration are reviewed, and a general equilibrium model of the relationship between the expansion of international trade and the adoption of arbitration is presented. The model focuses on the heterogeneity of economic agents in terms of their legal needs. It shows how arbitration alters the size and composition of markets, while at the same time responding to exogenous changes in trade. In addition, it shows how the legal services provided by the courts deteriorate in the presence of arbitration, predicting that the share of traders using arbitration should rise as markets expand. Overall, the model does remarkably well in generating results commonly discussed in the legal literature.

Suggested Citation

  • Casella, Alessandra, 1992. "Arbitration in International Trade," CEPR Discussion Papers 721, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:721
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=721
    Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alessandra Casella & Jonathan S. Feinstein, 1990. "Public Goods in Trade: On the Formation of Markets and Political Jurisdictions," NBER Working Papers 3554, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Paul R. Milgrom & Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, 1990. "The Role Of Institutions In The Revival Of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, And The Champagne Fairs," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(1), pages 1-23, March.
    3. Casella, Alessandra, 1992. "On Markets and Clubs: Economic and Political Integration of Regions with Unequal Productivity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(2), pages 115-121, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Alessandro Turrini & Tanguy Van Ypersele, 2001. "Traders, Courts and the Home Bias Puzzle," Development Working Papers 159, Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano, University of Milano.
    2. Bruno S. Frey, 2005. "Zwei Utopien jenseits des Weltstaates und der Anarchie," CREMA Working Paper Series 2005-32, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    3. Casella, Alessandra, 1993. "Trade as Engine of Political Change: A Parable," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers 233188, University of California-Berkeley, Department of Economics.
    4. Turrini, Alessandro Antonio & van Ypersele, Tanguy, 2006. "Legal Costs as Barriers to Trade," CEPR Discussion Papers 5751, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Bruce Benson, 1999. "To Arbitrate or To Litigate: That Is the Question," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 91-151, September.
    6. Turrini, Alessandro & van Ypersele, Tanguy, 2010. "Traders, courts, and the border effect puzzle," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(2-3), pages 81-91, May.
    7. Volckart, Oliver, 2004. "The economics of feuding in late medieval Germany," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 282-299, July.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Arbitration; Institutions; International Integration;

    JEL classification:

    • F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:721. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.