IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Rational Fools and Cooperation in a Poor Hydraulic Economy

  • Pranab Bardhan.

Local community-level water management is crucial for rural development in the poorest parts of the world, in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. Local cooperative institutions have been successful in water management in some cases, but there are numerous cases of failure. The paper draws upon the relevant lessons from the theoretical literature on cooperation in game theory, both in economics and evolutionary biology. Then it goes into the evidence from field studies by anthropologists and others on the conditions for success or failure of local cooperation. This points to some additional insights which the theoretical models are yet too constricted to incorporate.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Paper provided by University of California at Berkeley in its series Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers with number C93-015.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 01 May 1993
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ucb:calbcd:c93-015
Contact details of provider: Postal:
University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, CA USA

Phone: 510-642-0822
Fax: 510-642-6615
Web page: http://www.haas.berkeley.edu/groups/iber/wps/ciderwp.htm
Email:


More information through EDIRC

Order Information: Postal: IBER, F502 Haas Building, University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley CA 94720-1922
Email:


References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Bayoumi, Tamim & Eichengreen, Barry, 1993. "Macroeconomic Adjustment under Bretton Woods and the Post-Bretton-Woods Float: An Impulse-Response Analysis," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers 233178, University of California-Berkeley, Department of Economics.
  2. Jeff Frankel, Steve Phillips, and Menzie Chinn., 1992. "Financial and Currency Integration in the European Monetary System: The Statistical Record," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C92-005, University of California at Berkeley.
  3. Elster, Jon, 1989. "Social Norms and Economic Theory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 99-117, Fall.
  4. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucb:calbcd:c93-015. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.