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An Exploration of the Impact of Modern Arbitration Statutes on the Development of Arbitration in the United States

  • Benson, Bruce L

Findings from historical research show that the "evidence" generally cited to support the contention that arbitration is effective primarily because of the threat of court-imposed sanctions should actually be characterized as "historical assumptions." Arbitration statutes commanding courts to recognize arbitration settlements and arbitration clauses were not the stimulus for the growth of arbitration that they are often assumed to have been. In fact, arbitration backed by nonlegal sanctions was well established long before the passage of arbitration statutes. Furthermore, political demands for these statutes are primarily from bar associations, which saw arbitration without lawyers as a threat to their livelihood. Refutation of the supporting evidence does not necessarily reject the hypothesis that legal sanctions are prerequisites for some arbitration, but nonlegal sanctions clearly provide sufficient backing under many circumstances. Copyright 1995 by Oxford University Press.

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Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Journal of Law, Economics and Organization.

Volume (Year): 11 (1995)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
Pages: 479-501

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Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:11:y:1995:i:2:p:479-501
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