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An Exploration of the Impact of Modern Arbitration Statutes on the Development of Arbitration in the United States

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  • Benson, Bruce L

Abstract

Findings from historical research show that the "evidence" generally cited to support the contention that arbitration is effective primarily because of the threat of court-imposed sanctions should actually be characterized as "historical assumptions." Arbitration statutes commanding courts to recognize arbitration settlements and arbitration clauses were not the stimulus for the growth of arbitration that they are often assumed to have been. In fact, arbitration backed by nonlegal sanctions was well established long before the passage of arbitration statutes. Furthermore, political demands for these statutes are primarily from bar associations, which saw arbitration without lawyers as a threat to their livelihood. Refutation of the supporting evidence does not necessarily reject the hypothesis that legal sanctions are prerequisites for some arbitration, but nonlegal sanctions clearly provide sufficient backing under many circumstances. Copyright 1995 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Benson, Bruce L, 1995. "An Exploration of the Impact of Modern Arbitration Statutes on the Development of Arbitration in the United States," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(2), pages 479-501, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:11:y:1995:i:2:p:479-501
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bruce L. Benson, 1999. "Polycentric Law Versus Monopolized Law : Implications from International Trade for the Potential Success of Emerging Markets," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 15(Fall 1999), pages 36-66.
    2. Benson Bruce L., 2000. "Jurisdictional Choice in International Trade: Implications for Lex Cybernatoria," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-30, March.
    3. Russell S. Sobel & Brian J. Osoba, 2009. "Youth Gangs as Pseudo-Governments Implications for Violent Crime," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 996-1018, April.
    4. Bruce Benson, 2006. "Contractual nullification of economically-detrimental state-made laws," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 19(2), pages 149-187, June.
    5. Bruce Benson, 1999. "To Arbitrate or To Litigate: That Is the Question," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 91-151, September.
    6. repec:kap:revaec:v:31:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s11138-017-0382-3 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Schönfelder, Bruno, 2005. "The Puzzling Underuse of Arbitration in Post-Communism: A Law and Economics Analysis," Freiberg Working Papers 2005/07, TU Bergakademie Freiberg, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
    8. Peter T. Leeson, 2003. "Contracts Without Government," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 18(Spring 20), pages 35-54.
    9. Leeson, Peter T., 2007. "Better off stateless: Somalia before and after government collapse," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 689-710, December.
    10. Edward Stringham & Todd Zywicki, 2011. "Rivalry and superior dispatch: an analysis of competing courts in medieval and early modern England," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(3), pages 497-524, June.

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