Youth Gangs as Pseudo-Governments Implications for Violent Crime
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- Russell S. Sobel & Brian J. Osoba, 2009. "Youth Gangs as Pseudo-Governments: Implications for Violent Crime," Working Papers 09-09, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
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