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Arbitrator Behavior

Author

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  • Ashenfelter, Orley

Abstract

Arbitration systems are often used to resolve labor disputes because on-going employment relationships are likely to contain specific (human capital) investments. Recent research indicates that the ex ante acceptability of arbitration to the parties must depend, in part, on the unpredictability of the arbitrator's award. It is shown that the usual selection process for arbitrators does imply that arbitrator decisions should be statistically exchangeable (in the limit), and the evidence available to date supports this hypothesis.
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Suggested Citation

  • Ashenfelter, Orley, 1987. "Arbitrator Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(2), pages 342-346, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:77:y:1987:i:2:p:342-46
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    Cited by:

    1. Ashenfelter, O. & Bloom, D., 1990. "Lawyers As Agents Of The Devil In A Prisoner'S Dilemma Game," Papers 57, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
    2. Bruce L. Benson, 1999. "Polycentric Law Versus Monopolized Law : Implications from International Trade for the Potential Success of Emerging Markets," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 15(Fall 1999), pages 36-66.
    3. Benson Bruce L., 2000. "Jurisdictional Choice in International Trade: Implications for Lex Cybernatoria," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-32, March.
    4. Orley Ashenfelter & Gordon B. Dahl, 2003. "Strategic Bargaining Behavior, Self-Serving Biases, and the Role of Expert Agents An Empirical Study of Final-Offer Arbitration," Working Papers 857, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
    5. Janet Currie, 1991. "Rules, Coordination and Manipulability Among Arbitrators," NBER Working Papers 3821, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Alexandre Mas, 2006. "Pay, Reference Points, and Police Performance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 121(3), pages 783-821.
    7. Kevin F. Hallock & Craig Olson, 2006. "The Value of Stock Options to Non-Executive Employees," NBER Working Papers 11950, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Dickinson, David L., 2006. "The chilling effect of optimism: The case of final-offer arbitration," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 17-30, February.
    9. David Dickinson, 2003. "Mediation, Walrasian Tâtonnement, and Negotiations as an Exchange Economy," Working Papers 2003-11, Utah State University, Department of Economics.
    10. María Mercedes Adamuz & Clara Ponsatí, 2009. "Arbitration systems and negotiations," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 13(3), pages 279-303, September.
    11. Wojciech Olszewski, 2011. "A Welfare Analysis of Arbitration," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(1), pages 174-213, February.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D59 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Other

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