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Decision-Maker and Context Effects in Employment Arbitration

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  • Mark D. Gough
  • Alexander J. S. Colvin

Abstract

Using a novel survey of 274 employment arbitrators, this study investigates how decision-maker characteristics and the context of the arbitration proceeding affect employee outcomes. The authors analyze the predictors of settlement before an arbitrator award and, if no settlement is reached, the likelihood that an employee will receive a favorable verdict after a full hearing. Findings show that pre-arbitration dispute resolution procedures, such as mediation, have significant effects on settlement behavior and employee outcomes. The characteristics of the presiding arbitrator as well as the structure of the arbitration proceeding also influence employee outcomes at trial. This study contributes to the existing literature by describing the characteristics of employment arbitrators—an underexplored actor in industrial relations. In addition, it analyzes case outcomes, including settlements, across multiple arbitration forums and with more rigorous controls than those applied in existing data sets.

Suggested Citation

  • Mark D. Gough & Alexander J. S. Colvin, 2020. "Decision-Maker and Context Effects in Employment Arbitration," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 73(2), pages 479-497, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ilrrev:v:73:y:2020:i:2:p:479-497
    DOI: 10.1177/0019793919886578
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    5. Orley Ashenfelter, 1987. "Arbitrator Behavior," Working Papers 599, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
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