The contractual dispute resolution game : Real-effort experiments on contract negotiation and arbitration
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106902
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Keywords
Contractual disputes; Cooperation; Arbitration; Fairness; Risk-sharing; Laboratory experiments; Real-effort experiments; Car Assembly Real-effort Task (CART); Contractual Dispute Resolution Game (CDRG);All these keywords.
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