Does Fact-Finding Promote Settlement? Theory And A Test
Some labor negotiations include a break in which a non-binding recommendation is made by a fact-finder as an intermediate dispute resolution procedure. There is some uncertainty, however, as to whether this fact-finding increases or reduces the likelihood of settlement. Inasmuch as fact-finding reduces uncertainty about the outcome, it may “chill” bargaining and increase the need for additional dispute resolution procedures. On the other hand, the fact-finder’s recommendation may give the parties a focal point around which they are able to craft an agreement, thus reducing the incidence of disputes. Which of these effects dominates is a question that we consider using both a theoretical model and data from a controlled experimental bargaining environment.
|Date of creation:||Apr 2002|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://apec.usu.edu/Email: |
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:usu:wpaper:2002-06. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (John Gilbert)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.