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Combining "Real Effort" with Induced Effort Costs: The Ball-Catching Task

Author

Listed:
  • Simon Gaechter
  • Lingbo Huang
  • Martin Sefton

Abstract

We introduce the “ball-catching task”, a novel computerized real effort task, which combines “real” efforts with induced material cost of effort. The central feature of the ball-catching task is that it allows researchers to manipulate the cost of effort function as well as the production function, which permits quantitative predictions on effort provision. In an experiment with piece-rate incentives we find that the comparative static and the point predictions on effort provision are remarkably accurate. We also present experimental findings from three classic experiments, namely, team production, gift exchange and tournament, using the task. All of the results are closely in line with the stylized facts from experiments using purely induced values. We conclude that the ballcatching task combines the advantages of real effort with induced values, which is useful for theorytesting purposes as well as for applications.

Suggested Citation

  • Simon Gaechter & Lingbo Huang & Martin Sefton, 2015. "Combining "Real Effort" with Induced Effort Costs: The Ball-Catching Task," CESifo Working Paper Series 5345, CESifo Group Munich.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5345
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    Cited by:

    1. Barron, Kai & Gravert, Christina, 2018. "Confidence and Career Choices: An Experiment," Working Papers in Economics 715, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
    2. repec:kap:itaxpf:v:25:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s10797-017-9448-1 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Dominik Doll & Eberhard Feess & Alwine Mohnen, 2017. "Ability, Team Composition, and Moral Hazard: Evidence from the Laboratory," Schmalenbach Business Review, Springer;Schmalenbach-Gesellschaft, vol. 18(1), pages 49-70, February.
    4. Chen, Si & Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah, 2018. "Looking at the bright side: The motivation value of overconfidence," DICE Discussion Papers 291, University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    5. Dutcher, E. Glenn & Salmon, Timothy C. & Saral, Krista J., 2015. "Is "Real" Effort More Real?," MPRA Paper 68394, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Felipe Augusto de Araujo & Erin Carbone & Lynn Conell-Price & Marli W. Dunietz & Ania Jaroszewicz & Rachel Landsman & Diego Lamé & Lise Vesterlund & Stephanie Wang & Alistair J. Wilson, 2015. "The Effect of Incentives on Real Effort: Evidence from the Slider Task," CESifo Working Paper Series 5372, CESifo Group Munich.
    7. Barron, Kai & Gravert, Christina, 2018. "Beliefs and actions: How a shift in confidence affects choices," MPRA Paper 84743, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Elwyn Davies & Marcel Fafchamps, 2017. "When No Bad Deed Goes Punished: Relational Contracting in Ghana versus the UK," NBER Working Papers 23123, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. repec:eee:eecrev:v:101:y:2018:i:c:p:528-545 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Ambroise Decamps & Changxia Ke & Lionel Page, 2018. "How success breeds success," QuBE Working Papers 053, QUT Business School.
    11. Chen, Si & Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah, 2018. "Looking at the bright side: The motivation value of overconfidence," DICE Discussion Papers 291, University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    experimental design; real effort task; induced values; incentives; piece-rate theory; team incentives; gift exchange; tournaments; online real effort experiments;

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts

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