Migration and the evolution of conventions
This paper analyzes an evolutionary model where agents who are locally matched to play a general coordination game can adjust both their strategy and location. These decisions are subject to friction, so that an agent who migrates to a different location may be unable to adjust her strategy optimally to the new environment.
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- Farrell, Joseph, 1988. "Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 209-214.
- Joerg Oechssler, 1994.
"Decentralization and the Coordination Problem,"
Game Theory and Information
- Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
- Glen Ellison, 2010.
"Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
391, David K. Levine.
- Dieckmann, Tone, 1999. "The evolution of conventions with mobile players," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 93-111, January.
- Binmore, Ken & Samuelson, Larry, 1997. "Muddling Through: Noisy Equilibrium Selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 235-265, June.
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