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Migration and the evolution of conventions

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  • Bhaskar, V.
  • Vega-Redondo, Fernando

Abstract

This paper analyzes an evolutionary model where agents are locally matched to playa coordination game and can adjust both their strategy and location. Their decisions are subject to friction, so that an agent who migrates to a different location may be unable to adjust her strategy optimally to the new environment. A condition on off-equilibrium payoffs introduced by Aumann (1993) plays a major role in our characterization (for general coordination games) of the long-run outcomes. For the particular 2 x 2 case, this condition (which is unrelated to risk dominance) implies that the possibility of medium term simultaneous co-existence of conventions at different locations depends on whether the game is of "pure" coordination (where co-existence is always possible) or of the stag'-hunt type (where it is not). When we introduce noise (Le. mutations) into the model, this distinction continuous to play a crucial role in the selection of the long'-run equilibria: for large friction, both equilibria are stochastically stable in the former case, whereas only the efficient one is so in the latter.
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Suggested Citation

  • Bhaskar, V. & Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 2004. "Migration and the evolution of conventions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 397-418, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:55:y:2004:i:3:p:397-418
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ellison, Glenn, 1993. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1047-1071, September.
    2. Dieckmann, Tone, 1999. "The evolution of conventions with mobile players," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 93-111, January.
    3. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
    4. Farrell, Joseph, 1988. "Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 209-214.
    5. Binmore, Ken & Samuelson, Larry, 1997. "Muddling Through: Noisy Equilibrium Selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 235-265, June.
    6. Oechssler, Jorg, 1997. "Decentralization and the coordination problem," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 119-135, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Giorgio Fagiolo & Luigi Marengo & Marco Valente, 2004. "Endogenous Networks In Random Population Games," Mathematical Population Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(2), pages 121-147.
    2. Giorgio Fagiolo, 2005. "A Note on Equilibrium Selection in Polya-Urn Coordination Games," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(45), pages 1-14.
    3. Francesco Feri & Miguel A.Mel?ndez-Jim?nez, 2009. "Coordination in Evolving Networks with Endogenous Decay," Working Papers 2009-19, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
    4. Dieckmann, Tone, 1999. "The evolution of conventions with mobile players," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 93-111, January.
    5. Edward Droste & Robert P. Gilles & Cathleen Johnson, 2000. "Evolution of Conventions in Endogenous Social Networks," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0594, Econometric Society.
    6. Francesco Feri & Miguel Meléndez-Jiménez, 2013. "Coordination in evolving networks with endogenous decay," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 23(5), pages 955-1000, November.
    7. Matros, Alexander & Moser, Scott, 2015. "Coordination in a changing environment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 64-84.
    8. Tone Dieckmann, 1997. "The Evolution of conventions with Mobile Players," Economics, Finance and Accounting Department Working Paper Series n720897, Department of Economics, Finance and Accounting, National University of Ireland - Maynooth.
    9. Staudigl, Mathias & Weidenholzer, Simon, 2014. "Constrained interactions and social coordination," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 41-63.
    10. Sanjeev Goyal & Fernando Vega-Redondo, 2000. "Learning, Network Formation and Coordination," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0113, Econometric Society.
    11. Marianna Belloc & Ennio Bilancini & Leonardo Boncinelli & Simone D'Alessandro, 2017. "A Social Heuristics Hypothesis for the Stag Hunt: Fast- and Slow-Thinking Hunters in the Lab," CESifo Working Paper Series 6824, CESifo Group Munich.
    12. Luciano Andreozzi, 2005. "Hayek Reads the Literature on the Emergence of Norms," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 227-247, September.
    13. Conley, John P. & Neilson, William S., 2013. "Endogenous coordination and discoordination games: Multiculturalism and assimilation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 176-191.
    14. repec:esx:essedp:747 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Goyal, Sanjeev & Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 2005. "Network formation and social coordination," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 178-207, February.
    16. Ennio Bilancini & Leonardo Boncinelli, 2015. "Social coordination with locally observable types," Department of Economics 0051, University of Modena and Reggio E., Faculty of Economics "Marco Biagi".
    17. Ennio Bilancini & Leonardo Boncinelli, 2014. "Social coordination with locally observable types," Center for Economic Research (RECent) 108, University of Modena and Reggio E., Dept. of Economics "Marco Biagi".
    18. Tone Dieckmann, 1998. "Stochastic Learning and the Evolution of Conventions," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 187-212, September.
    19. Fei Shi, 2015. "Long-run technology choice with endogenous local capacity," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 59(2), pages 377-399, June.
    20. Simon Weidenholzer, 2010. "Coordination Games and Local Interactions: A Survey of the Game Theoretic Literature," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 1(4), pages 1-35, November.
    21. Siegfried Berninghaus & Stephan Schosser & Bodo Vogt, 2015. "Myopic behavior and overall utility maximization - A study of linked hawks and doves -," FEMM Working Papers 150014, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.

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    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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