Population Learning in a Model with Random Payoff Landscapes and Endogenous Networks
Population learning in dynamic economies with endogenous network formation has been traditionally studied in basic settings where agents face quite simple and predictable strategic situations (e.g. coordination). In this paper, we start instead to explore economies where the payoff landscape is very complicated (rugged). We propose a model where the payoff to any agent changes in an unpredictable way as soon as any small variation in the strategy configuration within its network occurs. We study population learning where agents: (i) are allowed to periodically adjust both the strategy they play in the game and their interaction network; (ii) employ some simple criteria (e.g. statistics such as MIN, MAX, MEAN, etc.) to myopically form expectations about their payoff under alternative strategy and network configurations. Computer simulations show that: (i) allowing for endogenous networks implies higher average payoff as compared to static networks; (ii) populations learn by employing network updating as a “global learning” device, while strategy updating is used to perform “fine tuning”; (iii) the statistics employed to evaluate payoffs strongly affect the efficiency of the system, i.e. convergence to a unique (multiple) steady-state(s); (iv) for some class of statistics (e.g. MIN or MAX), the likelihood of efficient population learning strongly depends on whether agents are change-averse in discriminating between options associated to the same expected payoff. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005
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Volume (Year): 24 (2005)
Issue (Month): 4 (June)
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